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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE ROLE OF
SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES
Charles W. Murdock*
Abstract: In reviewing decisions of a special litigation committee, courts have generally
applied the business judgment rule to the "second-tier" decision by the committee when it
moves to dismiss litigation challenging alleged "first-tier" wrongdoing. While all courts
inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee, and the adequacy of its
procedures, a judicial split exists as to whether the court can inquire into the substantive
reasons why the committee believes the litigation should be dismissed. This Article ana-
lyzes the nature of structural bias and contrasts the procedural rights which a plaintiff
possesses in a judicial proceeding with the lack of such rights in the special litigation
committee context. It concludes that Auerbach should never be the standard of review,
that Zapata is the appropriate standard where the "first-tier" wrong implicates the duty of
care, and that no deference should be given to the committee when the underlying wrong
involves a breach of the duty of loyalty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent furor over executive compensation has brought to light
an even more fundamental concern-the issue of corporate govern-
ance. Both the reality and the theory of corporate governance have
undergone radical change in this century. At the turn of the century,
ownership and management were related. Powerful men both owned
and exercised control over major corporations.' Later, Berle and
1. Prior to the turn of the century, big businesses were dominated b the Goulds, Vanderbilts,
Morgans, Armours, Fisks, and Rockefellers. See generally PETER COLLIER & DAVID
HOROWITz, THE ROCKEFELLERS-AN AMERICAN DYNASTY (1976). From 1900 to 1928, there
was a striking increase in the number of shareholders of many major corporations. For example,
the number of shareholders of DuPont Powder increased from 809 to 21,248; the shareholders of
Proctor and Gamble increased from 1,098 to 37,000; and the shareholders of United Fruit
increased from 971 to 26,219. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY app. H at 327 (1932). The dispersal of shareholdings
developed from the expansion of investment banking activity. For example, Dillon, Read bought
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Means identified a separation of ownership and control.2 Corpora-
tions were now managed by professional managers with little signifi-
cant stock ownership in the firms they managed. If professional
managers perpetuated themselves because fragmented shareholders
could not practically exercise effective power, then how could manage-
ment be held accountable? The response of institutional shareholders
to bad management was to "vote with their feet"-that is, to sell
rather than fight.3 Then, in the 1970s, spurred at least in part by the
concern of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)4 and the
American Law Institute project on corporate governance, 5 the concept
of the independent director was seized upon as the instrument that
would hold corporate managers responsible. Inextricably intertwined
with the increased use of independent or outside directors is the devel-
opment and expansion of the committee structure of the board of
directors.
The 1980s have seen the development of several phenomena that
markedly impact corporate governance-the spectacular rise in execu-
tive compensation,6 the takeover movement,7 the market for corporate
the Dodge Brothers Motor Company from the Dodge family, recapitalized it, and distributed the
securities to the public. See MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE MONEY LORDS 19 (1972). The
widespread dispersal of shareholdings led to the concentration of power in the hands of
management.
2. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. See, in particular, Chapter V, "The Evolution of
Control," at 69-111.
3. See Pension Funds in the Capital Markets: Hearing on the Impact on Corporate Governance,
Trading Activity and Beneficiaries Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 91
(1986) (testimony by Mr. James E. Heard, deputy director of the Investors Responsibility
Research Center, on "The Wall Street Rule" that holds if you do not agree with management,
you sell and buy somewhere else).
4. See SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
427-31 (1980) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT].
5. In May, 1978, the Council of the American Law Institute voted to undertake a study of
corporate governance. Four national symposia were held in the late 1970s. See COMMENTARIES
ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE-THE ALI-ABA SYMPoSIUMS 1977-1978, at
ix (Donald E. Schwartz ed., 1979). The project continues to date. See generally THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT (1992) [hereinafter A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT].
6. See, eg., Geoffrey Colvin, How to Pay the CEO Right, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at 60-69;
Are CEO's Paid Too Much?, Bus. WK., May 6, 1991, at 90-112; Bosses' Pay: Worthy of His
Hire?, ECONOMIST, Feb. lst-7th, 1992, at 19-22; It Doesn't Make Sense, FORBES, May 27, 1991,
at 208-89. See generally The SEC and the Issue of Runaway Executive Pay: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE
OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991).
7. See JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (history of the takeover movement and
its interrelationship with insider trading by the front-page editor of the Wall Street Journal).
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control and insider trading,' and the focus of this A:rticle, the develop-
ment of the special litigation committee as a means to shield director
wrongdoing from judicial scrutiny. These phenomena are related in
the following respects: the first three involve transactions which may
or may not involve harm to the corporation and may possibly impli-
cate wrongful conduct; the fourth involves process issues of who shall
determine whether harm exists or whether wrongful conduct is
implicated.
The last two years have dramatized the fact that there is little corre-
lation between executive compensation and executive performance.9
The issue has become increasingly visible because it comes at a time
when the rest of the work force is suffering from the effects of a reces-
sion. This has raised the query "why?" and called into question the
effectiveness of the board of directors. Why have these so-called
independent directors failed to exercise greater control and failed to
require enhanced corporate performance for increased compensation?
The answer lies in the fact that there is substantial mutuality of inter-
est between all directors of a corporation-both inside (management)
and outside (independent). As the Economist recently noted, "two-
thirds of outside directors in America are themselves chief executives
of other companies."'
Although the system has not worked well with one set of transac-
tions, executive compensation, that does not mean the system should
be junked or that radical responses are necessary. It does mean, how-
ever, that the system should be analyzed and that underlying assump-
tions should be reviewed for their current validity. For example, in
the executive compensation area, the SEC has reviewed and revised its
long-standing policy that this issue is a managerial one which is not a
proper subject for shareholder action. The SEC now recognizes that
this issue does involve policy considerations."
8. Id.
9. See supra note 6.
10. Bosses'Pay: Worthy of His Hire?, supra note 6, at 20; see also Barbara Rose, The Ties That
Bind-Web of Connected CEOs Rules Boardrooms, CRAIN'S, Apr. 13, 1992, at 1.
11. In view of the widespread public debate concerning executive and director
compensation policies and practices, and the increasing recognition that these issues raise
significant policy issues, it is the Division's view that proposals relating to senior executive
compensation no longer can be considered matters relating to a registrant's ordinary
business.
Baltimore Gas & Electric, SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 76,101, at 79,211 (Feb. 13, 1992). For comparable responses, see Aetna Life & Casu-
alty Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,104,
at 79,217 (Feb. 13, 1992); International Business Machines Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-
1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,106, at 79,220 (Feb. 13, 1992). The Securi-
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Even more fundamentally, it is necessary to review the concept of
the board of directors and the role of independent directors. How
does accountability work? What expertise do directors, particularly
the so-called outside or independent directors, bring with them to the
corporate boardroom? What, if any, is the role of the courts in corpo-
rate governance issues?
In the last decade or so, the answer of many courts and commenta-
tors to the last question has been basically "none." The mechanism by
which courts have generally reviewed the acts of corporate managers
has been the shareholder derivative suit. This device has always been
subject to mixed reviews. Some view it as a mechanism by which a
shareholder with a modest holding, often at the behest of an attorney,
can file a "strike suit."12 The corporation is then spurred by the suit's
nuisance value to pay a modest sum to rid itself of the unfounded liti-
gation rather than expend time and money to fight it in court. Others
view the device much more positively, seeing it as a necessary final
check on potential managerial misconduct.1 3 Traditionally, if director
ties and Exchange Commission has recently adopted new proxy rules dealing with executive
compensation. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31327,
Oct. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC Library, OMNI File, at 1992 SEC LEXIS 2468.
12. Shareholder derivative suits "could, if unconstrained, undermine the basic principle of
corporate governance that the decisions of a corporation-including the decision to initiate
litigation-should be made by the board of directors or the majority of shareholders." Daily
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530 (1984).
13. The American Law Institute has set forth a balanced appraisal of the derivative action:
Since at least the middle of the 19th Century, it has been accepted in this country and in
England that the law should permit shareholders to sue derivatively on their corporation's
behalf under appropriate conditions. The problem has been to determine what these
conditions should be. On the one hand, the availability of legal recourse is essential if
management's fiduciary obligations to its shareholders are to constitute more than a
precatory body of law. Some judicial mechanism for the enforcement of fiduciary duties
must therefore exist that is external to the corporation. On the other hand, few
intracorporate transactions are not susceptible to differences of opinion; nor are courts
infallible. Thus, the corporate director might have reason to view his position as exposed
and vulnerable if every transaction or alleged negligent omission subjected him to the
prospect of significant liability at the behest of a single shareholder.
In striking a proper balance, it must be recognized that the derivative action is neither the
initial nor primary protection for shareholders against managerial misconduct. A variety of
social and market forces also operate to hold corporate fiduciaries accountable: the
professional standards of managers, oversight by outside directors, the disciplinary power of
the market, and shareholder voting-all these mechanisms plus the regulatory authority of
governmental agencies would constitute significant protections in the absence of private
litigation. Even if dissatisfied shareholders had no other recourse than to sell their shares,
such action, taken collectively, might also inhibit managerial overreaching, to the extent it
depressed the value of the corporation's stock, which management typically also holds. Yet,
no single technique of accountability (including market and legal remedies) is likely to be
optimal under all circumstances. Each has its characteristic and well-known limitations,
and, as a result, shareholders are best served by an overlapping system of protections. When
Washington Law Review Vol. 68:79, 1993
misconduct is alleged, a plaintiff need not make demand on the board
of directors but may file a suit alleging the reasons why demand was
not made. 14 If substantiated, the court would then determine the mer-
its of the case.
However, the development of the special litigation committee, and
the expansion of situations in which demand must be made upon the
boards of directors, have had a dramatically chilling effect upon share-
holder derivative suits. If demand must be made on the board and the
board refuses to sue, one view holds that the only recourse for the
shareholder is then to sue the directors for wrongful refusal. But if the
existing board, or the committee to which the matter was referred, was
not involved in the challenged transaction, the decision not to sue
would be protected by the business judgment rule which effectively
insulates directors against an adverse ruling.15
If demand need not be made and suit is filed, as will generally be the
case when the directors who were involved in the challenged decision
still sit on the board, the typical response in recent years has been for
the directors to appoint to the board two or three new ("independ-
ent") directors who constitute a special litigation committee with the
task of determining whether the litigation against their fellow directors
should go forward. Invariably the committee moves to dismiss the
litigation. This Article will address the issue of what deference, if any,
properly structured, the derivative action should enhance the capabilities of these other
mechanisms of accountability by (I) ensuring a measure of judicial oversight, (2) providing
for a remedy that does not depend upon the ability of widely dispersed shareholders to take
coordinated action, and (3) protecting the free functioning of the market for corporate
control by subjecting to a measure ofjudicial review improper actions intended to prevent a
change in control. In addition, the derivative action may offer the only effective remedy in
those circumstances where a control group has the ability to engage in self-dealing
transactions with the corporation.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS 3-4 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985).
14. In recent litigation, Judge Easterbrook created a federal rule to require shareholder
demand on the board of directors before any derivative action could be filed. Kamen v. Kemper
Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1990). However, tl e Supreme Court rejected
such judicial creativity. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991). On remand,
Judge Easterbrook opined that Maryland would follow Delaware, the "dominant corporate
jurisdiction, [which] has emphatically rejected the proposition that an investor may forego
demand whenever the directors participate in the transaction [plaintiffs] challenge." Kamen v.
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 939 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 454 (1991).
15. Requiring a shareholder to make demand on the board of directors before instituting suit
is generally the death knell for a shareholder's derivative suit. "[O]nce a demand has been made,
absent a wrongful refusal, the stockholders' ability to initiate a derivative suit is terminated."
Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990) (quoting Stotland v. GAF Corp., 469 A.2d
421, 422 (Del. 1983)). "[W]hen a board refuses a demand, the only issues to be examined are the
good faith and reasonableness of its investigation." Id. at 777.
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courts should give to such motions to dismiss. If the court defers to
the committee, the court will have effectively abdicated any role in
overseeing corporate governance.
To understand the process by which courts have been ceding their
authority to the board of directors, it is necessary to understand the
historical distinctions between two fiduciary duties, the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty, and the effect of the business judgment rule on
judicial oversight. The duty of care requires directors to exercise some
degree of care' 6 when managing the assets which shareholders have
contributed. The duty of loyalty precludes directors from using their
position to enrich themselves at the expense of the shareholders.
Courts, in dealing with duty of care issues, have developed the busi-
ness judgment rule, whereby courts generally will not second-guess
managerial decisions. 7 A plaintiff, in a duty of care case, has the bur-
den of proof and is confronted by the presumption arising from the
business judgment rule that managers exercised proper care. Contra-
riwise, in a duty of loyalty case, the burden is on the defendant to
justify his or her self-dealing actions.
In recent shareholder derivative suit litigation involving special liti-
gation committees, courts have analyzed the issues by recognizing two
tiers of corporate decision making.' 8 The first tier involves the acts of
directors which give rise to the alleged wrongful conduct. The second
tier is the decision of the special litigation committee to determine
whether the litigation based upon the first tier actions ought to be dis-
missed. Courts thus far have focused strictly upon the second-tier
decision. In one line of cases, if the directors making the second-tier
decision whether to continue litigation against their fellow directors
are themselves not implicated in the first-tier alleged wrongdoing,
absolute deference is given to the second-tier decision on the basis of
the business judgment rule.' 9 Another line of cases would permit the
court some latitude in reviewing the substantive merits of the second-
tier decision."z
The thrust of this Article is to challenge the existing analysis and to
argue that the deference, if any, accorded the second-tier decision can-
not be determined without reference to the nature of the first-tier
alleged wrongdoing-that is, whether the alleged wrongdoing impli-
cates the duty of care or the duty of loyalty. This position results from
16. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
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examining the relative competence of directors and courts and from
recognizing that directors, when passing judgment upon those with
whom they serve, are subject to structural bias, a fact well demon-
strated by the executive compensation uproar. It is proper for courts
to accord some deference to independent directors who evaluated the
business judgments which are challenged in duty of care cases. How-
ever, courts, and not directors, have experience in assessing the type of
wrongdoing which is challenged in duty of loyalty cases. Thus, defer-
ence-and certainly not abdication-is not appropriate where the
alleged first-tier wrongdoing implicates the duty of loyalty.
This Article first traces the evolution of the committee concept and
the two primary existing lines of authority regarding judicial deference
to special litigation committees. It then develops the duty of care/
duty of loyalty distinction and analyzes the bases for the existence of
structural bias. It concludes by challenging the use of the special liti-
gation committee concept in the closely held corporation situation
where the board of directors is generally a non-functioning entity.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMITTEE
STRUCTURE
During the 1970s, as a result of renewed interest in and concern
about corporate governance,2 the use of committees by boards of
directors expanded substantially. Prior to this time, the most promi-
nently used committee was the executive committee. This committee
very early received statutory acknowledgement,22 with the first exten-
sive provisions regarding this committee appearing in section 38 of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act of 193323 which formed the basis for
the Model Business Corporation Act.24
In the 1960s and 1970s, other committees came into use, in part as a
result of developments in other areas of law. For example, the use of a
compensation committee, at least insofar as it had jurisdiction over
stock options, was sparked by the introduction of qualified stock
options into the Internal Revenue Code of 195425 and by the concern
about avoiding short-swing profit liability under section 16(b) of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act.2 6 The regulations under the Code
21. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 427-29.
22. See, e.g., Illinois General Corporation Act of 1919, § 26, 1919 Ill. Laws 316, 322.
23. 1933 Ill. Laws 310, 327.
24. See Ray Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 412, 424 (1952);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 38 (1953).
25. See I.R.C. §§ 421-425 (1991).
26. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (West 1981).
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allowed the board of directors or some other group to have authority
to select particular employees from the group eligible under the plan
to be awarded options.2" If a committee composed of disinterested
directors had such authority, the acquisition of a stock option would
be exempt from section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.28
By 1970, audit and nominating committees, as well as compensation
committees, had come into use, sometimes with specific statutory
authorization and sometimes pursuant to the general power of the
board of directors to delegate its authority. For example, the Model
Business Corporation Act and the Illinois Business Corporation Act
did not provide specifically for committees other than the executive
committee until 195929 and 1984,10 respectively, while Delaware, for
many years, has broadly provided that the board of directors
may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board, designate 1
or more committees ... which to the extent provided in the resolution of
the board of directors, or the by-laws of the corporation, shall have and
may exercise all the power and authority of the board of directors in the
management of the business and affairs of the corporation.3 1
The development of these committees in the publicly held corpora-
tion 32 has been viewed very positively by commentators on corporate
governance.33 This is, at least in part, because committee development
has proceeded side-by-side with the practice of adding nonmanage-
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.422-2(b)(3) (1984).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1992).
29. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 38, at 641-42 (1960).
30. See Illinois Business Corp. Act § 8.40, 1983 Ill. Laws 6943, 6988-89 (codified at ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.40 (Smith-Hurd 1985)).
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1991).
32. While only 8% of the companies surveyed by the Conference Board had nominating
committees before 1970, JEREMY BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: THE
NOMINATING COMMITrEE AND THE DIRECTOR SELECTION PROCESS, CONFERENCE BOARD
REPORT No. 812, at 7 (1981) [hereinafter THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE], the number had
increased to about 30% by 1979. Id.; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 616. The increase in
the use of audit committees during the 1970s was even more spectacular. In a 1961 study by the
National Industrial Conference Board, it was found that only 15% of the responding companies
had an audit committee, JOHN R. KINLEY, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES, STUDIES IN
BUSINESS POLICY, No. 103, tbl. 29 at 129 (1962); by 1972, the number had risen to 45%, and by
1978, 97% of the companies responding to a survey by the American Society of Corporate
Secretaries reported they had an audit committee. JEREMY BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP
PRACTICES: THE AUDIT COMMITTEE, CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT No. 766, at 1 (1979). A
study by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1980 reported that 84% of all companies
surveyed and 99% of New York Stock Exchange companies had audit committees. SEC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 4, at 615.
33. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 476-77 (and sources cited therein); ABA
Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1625-26
(1978).
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ment "outside" directors to the board of directors. As nonmanage-
ment directors are added to the board, the size of the board will
increase and efficiency dictates that the board should be broken down
into committees. According to the Business Roundtable, the use of
committees compensates for the fact that outside directors can only
function part-time, permits a better focus on particular problems and a
more intensive exploration of those problems, and permits develop-
ment and utilization of specialized knowledge and experience.34
In addition to these standing committees, other ad hoe committees
also have been used. For example, in conffict of interest situations,
section 144 of Delaware's General Corporation Law provides that
transactions involving an interested director are not voidable solely for
that reason if, inter alia, the transactions were approved by a commit-
tee of disinterested directors.35 Building upon the general statutory
authorization for committees, another ad hoc committee-the special
litigation committee--developed in the 1970s and became prominent
in the 1980s. 36
The origin of special litigation committees appears to have been in
the ancillary relief that the Securities and Exchange Commission has
sought in its enforcement litigation.37 The real impetus for their estab-
lishment came out of the "improper foreign payments" cases of the
1970s. 38 Litigation in this area was triggered when a shareholder filed
a derivative suit, generally against the inside directors who had
authorized the questionable payments (sometimes amounting to mil-
lions of dollars), and sought, on behalf of the corporation, to recover
the amount of the payments from the inside directors.3 9 The corpora-
tion would respond by appointing a committee of disinterested direc-
tors who would investigate the merits of the litigation and, almost
invariably, recommend dismissal of the litigation.'
34. Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2109 (1978).
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991); see infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the inconsistency between the statutorily approved conflict of interest
committees and special litigation committees, see infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
37. See SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,807
(Oct. 1, 1974).
38. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. AImerican Ship Bldg. Co.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,498 (Apr. 15, 1974).
39. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (the corporation was alleged
to have made "questionable payments" exceeding $11 million).
40. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 161 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1988) [hereinafter A.L.I. TENTATIVE
DRAFT No. 8]; James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation:
A Critique of Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959.
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During the 1980s, a split of authority arose over what weight the
recommendation of a special litigation committee should be accorded
and what the standard for judicial review of the committee's decision
should be. Concern was also raised about the structural bias that
exists in the decisions of such a committee. While these issues were
addressed, if not resolved, in the 1980s, two other critical issues will
draw the attention of the courts in the 1990s: whether courts should
defer to special litigation committee recommendations when the
underlying litigation alleges breach of the duty of loyalty rather than
the duty of care, and whether such a committee ought to be recog-
nized at all in disputes involving closely held corporations where the
board of directors has traditionally been little more than a formality.
III. DIFFERING JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SPECIAL
LITIGATION COMMITTEES
The highest courts of six states have considered the power of a spe-
cial litigation committee to terminate derivative suits against board
members.41 The two earliest cases, which take opposing viewpoints
and which are the most frequently cited, are Auerbach v. Bennett4"
and Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.43 Auerbach held that a court may
review the independence and good faith of the committee and the suffi-
ciency of its investigation, but may not inquire into the merits of the
recommendation-a one-step approach. Zapata, however, employed a
two-step approach: after making the Auerbach review, the court may
apply its own independent business judgment as to whether the com-
mittee's motion should be granted. Massachusetts,' North Caro-
lina,45 and Alabama46 have substantially followed or even broadened
the Zapata formula for judicial review, while Iowa has held that inter-
ested directors do not have the power to confer upon a committee the
power to terminate a derivative action.47 In addition, intermediate
41. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
42. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
43. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
44. Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1990) (discussed infra notes 207-09, 250-55, 282-91
and accompanying text).
45. Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987) (state supreme court withdrew its earlier
opinion following Auerbach and instead adopted a Zapata approach).
46. Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629 (Ala. 1981). Roberts actually cited the
chancery opinion in Zapata and adopted an approach which deviated from the chancery court's
approach in a manner that mirrored the Delaware Supreme Court's modification of the chancery
decision.
47. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983) (structural
bias precluded recognition of action by a special litigation committee which had been appointed
by the defendant directors).
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appellate courts in California,4 8 Colorado,4 9 Florida,5" Illinois, 5' and
Minnesota52 have dealt with issues involving special litigation
committees.
A. Auerbach v. Bennett: Expansion of the Business Judgment Rule
Auerbach v. Bennett5 3 is arguably an unwarranted extension of the
business judgment rule which can only be understood in light of its
facts. Auerbach was a "questionable payments" case-the corporation
had paid bribes and kickbacks to foreigners totaling more than eleven
million dollars. 4 The company initiated an internal investigation and
reported its results in its proxy statement to shareholders in 1976." 5
Almost immediately, Auerbach filed a derivative suit against the cor-
poration's directors and auditors. 6 Four members of the board of
directors were named as defendants and served, thirteen other mem-
bers were named but not served.5 7 The three directors comprising the
special litigation committee had joined the board after the challenged
transactions had taken place and were vested with full authority to act
for the board with respect to the derivative action.5 8
The committee, after a six-month investigation, concluded that
none of the defendants had profited personally, that the suit was with-
out merit, that senior management would be distracted by the continu-
ance of the suit, that continued publicity would be damaging to the
company's business, that litigation costs would be extremely high, and
that there was only a remote likelihood of success.5 9 The committee
48. Will v. Engebretson & Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939) (discussed infra notes
211-15, 272-81 and accompanying text).
49. Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (court declined to
recognize recommendation of a special litigation committee which had been appointed by
defendant directors and reported to them).
50. DeMoya v. Fernandez, 559 So. 2d 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (reversed trial court's
grant of motion by receiver of corporation to dismiss derivative suit on the basis that plaintiffs
were entitled to sworn testimony and cross examination on issues of bia., conflict of interest, and
objectivity and reasonableness of report).
51. Axelrod v. Giambalvo, 472 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (applied special litigation
committee analogy to suit against predecessor managing trustees whose duty of care was
challenged, e.g., predecessor trustees spent $15,000 on light bulbs for apartment building
complex).
52. Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
53. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
54. Id. at 997.
55. Id. at 996-97.
56. Id. at 997.
57. Id. at 997 n.2.
58. Id. at 997.
59. Id.
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directed the corporation's general counsel to take that position in pres-
ent and pending litigation.'
The question, as the court saw it, was whether the first-tier bribes
and kickbacks could be insulated from judicial scrutiny by the second-
tier corporate action in reviewing them.6 The court concluded that
the special litigation committee's finding that the best interests of the
corporation would not be served by continuing the action against the
defendant directors should stand.62 According to the court, the valid-
ity of the second-tier decision to terminate the derivative litigation
turned upon "the proper application of the business judgment doctrine
... [to a] decision . . of disinterested directors."63 The court first
identified the underlying basis for the business judgment rule:
It appears to us that the business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is
grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and
infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially busi-
ness judgments. The authority and responsibilities vested in corporate
directors, both by statute and decisional law, proceed on the assumption
that inescapably there can be no available objective standard by which
the correctness of every corporate decision may be measured, by the
courts or otherwise. Even if that were not the case, by definition the
responsibility for business judgments must rest with the corporate direc-
tors; their individual capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them
for the discharge of that responsibility. Thus, absent evidence of bad
faith or fraud (of which there is none here) the courts must and properly
should respect their determinations. 64
The court then concluded that "derivative claims against corporate
directors belong to the corporation itself. As with other questions of
corporate policy and management, the decision whether and to what
extent to explore and prosecute such claims lies within the judgment
and control of the corporation's board of directors., 65
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1000.
62. Id. at 1002.
63. Id. at 1000.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court phrased the issue as being whether "the business judgement rule... applies
in its full vigor to shield from judicial scrutiny the decision of a three-person minority committee
of the board acting on behalf of the full board not to prosecute a shareholder's derivative action,"
and held that
[t]he business judgment rule does not foreclose inquiry by the courts into the disinterested
independence of... the members of the special litigation committee. Indeed the rule shields
the deliberations and conclusions of the chosen representatives of the board only if they
possess a disinterested independence and do not stand in a dual relation which prevents an
unprejudicial exercise of judgment.
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The court viewed the action of the committee as comprising two
components: the selection of procedures and the ultimate substantive
decision. With respect to the substantive decision, the court held that
[i]nquiry into such matters would go to the very core of the business
judgment made by the committee. To permit judicial probing of such
issues would be to emasculate the business judgment doctrine as applied
to the actions and determinations of the special litigation committee. Its
substantive evaluation of the problems posed and its judgment in their
resolution are beyond our reach.66
However, with respect to procedures, judicial inqairy was not fore-
closed because
courts are well equipped by long and continuing experience and practice
to make [such] determinations. In fact they are better qualified in this
regard than are corporate directors in general. Nor do the determina-
tions to be made in the adoption of procedures partake of the nuances or
special perceptions or comprehensions of business judgment or corpo-
rate activities or interests. The question is solely how appropriately to
set about to gather the pertinent data. 67
The committee in Auerbach also had the burden of demonstrating
that the investigation was carried out in "good faith.",68 While the
relative weight to be accorded the facts uncovered by the investigation
is beyond judicial review, "[p]roof... that the investigation has been
so restricted in scope, so shallow in execution, or otherwise so pro
forma or halfhearted as to constitute a pretext or sham,... would raise
questions of good faith or conceivably fraud which would never be
shielded by that doctrine." '69
B. Zapata v. Maldonado: A Two-Step Approach
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 70 on the other hand, -dealt with a situa-
tion that was clearly within the competence of a court to resolve.
Zapata involved a board of directors action which accelerated the
exercise date of stock options so that they became exercisable immedi-
ately before a self-tender at a premium.71 This action saved the execu-
tives substantial taxes but, at the same time, cost the corporation
deductions which, from a tax standpoint, would have saved it several
Id. at 1001.
66. Id. at 1002.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1003.
69. Id.
70. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
71. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Del. Ch. 1980).
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hundred thousand dollars.72 The court viewed this as a "demand-
excused" case in which demand would have been futile.7"
At the outset, the Zapata court recognized that power to control
litigation, even derivative litigation, remains in the board even though
the board is tainted by self-interest. "The problem is one of member
disqualification, not the absence of power in the board."74 Accord-
ingly, the board could delegate its power to an independent committee
composed of disinterested board members.7 According to the court,
the problem then became, on the one hand, that of determining the
proper balance between the power of the board to rid the corporation
of meritless or harmful litigation and strike suits, and, on the other,
preventing untrammeled board power to wrest bona fide derivative
actions away from the courts with the result that such a suit would
lose "much, if not all, of its generally-recognized effectiveness as an
intra-corporate means of policing boards of directors."76
The Zapata court did not see strict adherence to the business judg-
ment rule as striking the proper balance. Not only should courts rec-
ognize that the suit was properly brought in the first instance, since
demand was excused, but courts should also be aware that, when
directors pass judgment upon fellow directors, a "there but for the
grace of God go I" empathy might play a role.7 7 In addition, since
directors tend to be cut from the same bolt of cloth,78 there is a possi-
bility of "subconscious abuse."'79
In Zapata, the corporation had moved alternatively to dismiss the
suit or for summary judgment.8" According to the court, this reflected
the fact that a motion in this context fit into no "ready pigeonhole"
but was a hybrid between the two motions. 81 The court also saw par-
allels to judicial approval of a settlement and the situation where a
plaintiff seeks dismissal of its suit after an answer has been filed.82
Accordingly, the Zapata court chose "a middle course between those
cases which yield to the independent business judgment of a board
committee and this case as determined below which would yield to
72. Id. at 1255.
73. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784.
74. Id. at 786.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 786-87.
77. Id. at 787.
78. See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
79. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787.
80. Id. at 780.
81. Id. at 787.
82. Id. at 788.
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unbridled plaintiff stockholder control. '8 3 The balance was achieved
by applying a two-step test to the committee determination:
(i) the first step involved the Auerbach test in which the corporation has
the burden of proving the independence and good faith of the committee
and the reasonableness of its investigation; and
(ii) the second step involved the court applying "its own independent
business judgment" as to whether the motion should be granted.84
The purpose of the second step is "to thwart instances where corpo-
rate actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not
appear to satisfy its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply
prematurely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further
consideration in the corporation's interest. '85 In making such a deter-
mination, the court should "give special consideration to matters of
law and public policy," as well as the corporation's best interests.8 6
C. Can a Court Exercise Business Judgment?
The Zapata court has been criticized for suggesting that a court can
exercise its own "business judgment."8 " On the other hand, a distin-
guished member of the Delaware corporate bar has recognized that
"[i]f... all judicial review of the merits of the committee's decision is
foreclosed, there will be very few cases where a committee, once
formed and put to work judging their peers, will conclude that the
litigation should proceed."88
The basic purpose of the business judgment rule is a defensive one-
to protect directors against litigation premised upon their making
business decisions. What this has meant in the past is that, when the
duty of care exercised by an officer or director has been challenged, the
presumption is in favor of the action taken by the officer or director
and the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff. While directors
are spoken of as having a duty of care, this has never meant that they
are liable for mere negligence. In practice, they have only been held
liable for conduct that amounts to gross negligence or worse.89 Subse-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 788-89.
85. Id. at 789.
86. Id.
87. Dennis J. Block & H. Adam Prussin, The Business Judgmerst Rule and Shareholder
Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 63 (1981).
88. E. Norman Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of Directors' Business
Decisions-An Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37 Bus.
LAW. 1247, 1273 (1982).
89. In Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of America, 224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966), the defendant
inside directors raised funds by representing in a prospectus that the existing plant facilities were
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quent to Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court expressly articulated
the gross negligence standard in Smith v. Van Gorkom. 90
Courts seek to use the business judgment rule affirmatively in the
special litigation committee context. In Auerbach, the result was to
deflect focus from the first-tier transgression and focus inquiry upon
the second-tier decision of the board of directors to dismiss the first-
tier litigation against their fellow directors. While the result in
Auerbach-dismissal of the litigation-may have been proper, the
rationale is faulty. Courts are entitled to review the substantive deci-
sion of a special litigation committee-not to substitute their judg-
ment, but to ensure that the decision of the special litigation
committee was not a whitewash of grossly negligent conduct. The
Auerbach court itself recognized that a court could scrutinize the
investigation to insure that it has not been so "shallow... proforma or
halfhearted" as to evidence bad faith.91 What Auerbach failed to rec-
ognize is that judicial scrutiny of the conclusion is necessary to insure
that it is not shallow or pro forma.
This is, in effect, what the court in Zapata was proposing. Zapata
recognized that a special litigation committee could follow extensive
procedures, such as hiring a major law firm to interview 140 people
and produce reams of paper,92 and yet come to an unwarranted con-
clusion. The Zapata court unfortunately used a term implying com-
mercial competence-exercising its own "business judgment"-to
review the conclusions of the special litigation committee rather than
using the more appropriate judicial language-"manifestly unreasona-
ble" or "unsupported by the evidence"-that a court uses when
reviewing the decision of another body.
Auerbach, to the extent it can be read as precluding any review of
the substantive decision of the special litigation committee, is simply
bad law. Were the special litigation committee to be sued for failing to
pursue the litigation against the directors in the first-tier transgression,
the business judgment rule, used defensively, would protect them from
inadequate and that the corporation needed to move to specified modem facilities in another
state. Instead, the directors continued to operate in the unsuitable existing location until the
corporation became insolvent. Id. at 639. In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J.
1981), the defendant director, a widow, stood by while her two sons looted the corporation, a
reissuance broker, of almost $10 million which should have been escrowed for the insurance
companies doing business through the corporation.
90. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In Van Gorkom, the directors, who had not been informed of
the purpose of the meeting, approved the sale of the company after a twenty-minute oral
presentation by the CEO. Id.
91. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003 (N.Y. 1979).
92. See infra note 160.
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liability. It is inappropriate, however, to use the business judgment
rule offensively to preclude judicial review of the merits when directors
engage in palpably grossly negligent conduct. 93
Zapata, on the other hand, is an appropriate sta:adard of review to
use when the challenged first-tier conduct involves a breach of the
duty of care. If an independent and disinterested committee of the
board reviews an operating decision by other directors and concludes
that such decision or conduct did not involve self-dealing by the
defendants and was rationally justified, and if a court, in a proceeding
akin to summary judgment, concludes that the recommendation by
the special litigation committee is supported by the record, then the
litigation should be terminated.
While the Zapata approach can be justified when the underlying
cause of action is predicated upon a breach of the duty of care, it can-
not be justified when the defendant directors are charged with breach-
ing their duty of loyalty to the corporation. There is absolutely no
reason to defer to the board of directors when the underlying first-tier
violation involves a breach of the duty of loyalty, or self-dealing. As
the following section will discuss, in duty of loyalty cases as opposed
to duty of care cases, it is the courts, not boards of directors, that have
the relevant expertise. Thus, the controlling issue in determining
whether to defer to the recommendation of a special litigation commit-
tee ought to be whether the duty of care or the duty of loyalty is
implicated.
IV. DUTY OF CARE V. DUTY OF LOYALTY
A. Factual Distinctions Between Auerbach and Zapata
Perhaps the differing approaches in Auerbach and Zapata can be
rationalized on the basis that the underlying litigation in Auerbach
involved a breach of the duty of care, whereas the allegations in
Zapata charged self-dealing. In Auerbach, the problem was one of
questionable payments made by the corporation in connection with its
overseas activities. 94 There was no self-enrichment by the defendant
directors, and even various cabinet departments of our government
differed over the wrongfulness of the challenged acts.95
93. In the cases previously addressed, see supra notes 89-90, should directors escape liability
because a court, under the Auerbach approach, could not "peek" at the underlying transgression
if a special litigation committee recommended dismissal? See infra notes 111-15 and
accompanying text.
94. Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 996-97.
95. See John A. Conway, Corruption Confusion, FORBES, Jan. 8, 1979, at 12; John A.
Conway, How Pure Is Pure?, FORBES, Sept. 3, 1979, at 8.
Vol. 68:79, 1993
Corporate Governance
On the other hand, in Zapata, the day before the board approved a
self-tender at $25, the board, in a special meeting, accelerated the exer-
cise date of outstanding stock options to the current date when the
stock was trading at $18.50.96 Then, the six senior officers purchased
151,200 shares pursuant to the accelerated options.9 7 Because the
spread between the fair market value at the date of exercise (either
$18.50 or $25 depending upon whether the exercise date was acceler-
ated) and the exercise price of $12.15 was taxable to the officer at ordi-
nary income rates but was also deductible by the corporation, the
effect of the acceleration was to deprive the corporation of a $1 million
tax deduction. 98 The special litigation committee, in determining that
continuation of the litigation was not in the best interest of the corpo-
ration, set forth some boilerplate reasoning that was not supported by
the facts. 99
The reasoning of the committee certainly did not reflect such insight
which only a businessman, and not a court, would possess. The situa-
tion was clear: the defendants took corporate action which resulted in
an effective transfer of approximately $400,000 from the corporation
to themselves. Depending upon the relative tax rates of the corpora-
96. Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 671
F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982).
97. Id.
98. Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
99. The conclusions of the committee with regard to the self-dealing of the directors was as
follows:
(i) [T]he claims asserted appear to be without merit; (ii) litigation costs would be
inordinately high in view of the unlikelihood of success and would be further exacerbated by
the probable right of indemnification by the defendants from the Company if the defendants
are successful; (iii) the time and talents of the Company's senior management would be
wasted on lengthy pretrial and trial proceedings; (iv) continuing publicity about past events
could be damaging to the Company's ongoing and future business; (v) there does not appear
to have been any material injury to the Company; (vi) further legal action against the
present defendants (other than Messrs. Flynn, Naess or Wolcott) could significantly impair
their ability to manage the Company's affairs; (vii) litigation is unnecessary as a policing
action as the possibility of recurrence is slight in light of new internal controls and new top
management; (viii) none of the present defendants obtained any improper personal benefit
from the conduct alleged; (ix) certain of the practices alleged were a continuing business
practice at the time and were intended to serve the business interests of the Company;
(x) there is a serious legal question whether the New York and Texas Complaints state a
cause of action under the federal securities laws and whether the Company has standing to
assert such a claim; (xi) the continuation of these actions will undermine employee morale,
as will any attempt to revoke options already granted and/or exercised or to call any loans
currently outstanding; and (xii) the likely adverse effects on the relationship between the
Company and the defendants, on the one hand, and the Company and its suppliers and
customers, on the other, far outweigh any potential recovery.
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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tion and the executives, the corporation probably lost substantially
more than the executives gained.' °
B. Relative Competence Between Directors and Courts
Compensation decisions, such as those in Zapata, involve a clear
conflict of interest."'0 Critics of Zapata, downplaying the ability of a
court to use its own independent business judgment in evaluating a
committee recommendation, have stated that "[t]he very concept that
courts have independent business judgment is, in fact, a contradiction
of over 250 years of legal development."'' 0 2 This statement is correct if
a fact pattern involving disinterested director judgment with respect to
business operations is at issue.
On the other hand, judicial abdication of oversight of fiduciaries in
situations involving self-dealing would be a contradiction of over 500
years of legal development. 103 For centuries, courts have been review-
ing and enforcing the fiduciary duties of trustees, partners, agents,
officers, and directors. There is nothing to indicate that directors,
interested or disinterested, are any more astute in recognizing conflicts
of interest or other breaches of fiduciary duty than are the courts.
In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. There are hundreds of
reported cases in which directors have been charged with conflicts of
interest."o Thus, in these cases, the board of directors either did not
recognize the problem or crassly ignored it. Although directors have
sometimes been terminated by their fellow directors for conflicts of
interest °5 or improprieties,' °6 this does not establish that directors are
more astute than courts in recognizing and dealing with this problem.
In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court recently charged the board of
100. If the corporation were subject to a 46% rate, it lost $452,08E; (46% x $6.50 x 151,200
shares), whereas the most likely maximum benefit to the executives, based upon the difference
between the capital gains rate and the income rate, was $294,840 ((50% - 20%) x $6.50 x 151,200
shares).
101. Committee on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 35
Bus. LAw. 1335, 1347 (1980) ("The compensation of key executives is probably the most
frequently recurring conflict-of-interest situation with which the board must deal.").
102. Block & Prussin, supra note 87, at 63.
103. See Katharine, Duchess of Suffolk v. Herenden, before Sir Nicholas Bacon L.K. (1560),
reprinted (in Law French) in 93 LAW Q. REv. 36, 36-37 (1977) (translation on file with the
Washington Law Review).
104. A LEXIS search, States Library, Omni file, of "conflict w/3 interest w/25 director or
officer w/25 corporate!" found 431 cases.
105. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD 12 (1988).
106. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLE, THE CHANGING BOARD 11 (1987).
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Macmillan, Inc. with being "torpid, if not supine" ' 7 for failing to rec-
ognize a conflict of interest problem.
This negative data does not implicate directors in general. It does
suggest, however, that directors are not automatically cloaked with
expertise on conflicts of interest. Directors are predominantly busi-
ness executives." 8 Their experience should provide them with judg-
ment on business matters, certainly more than can be expected of
judges. However, business experience provides no particular insight
into fiduciary responsibilities, whereas courts deal with this issue con-
tinuously. Accordingly, the pattern reflected by the Auerbach and
Zapata cases is out of phase. Deference to a second-tier special litiga-
tion committee decision on whether the corporation should pursue a
first-tier claim against other directors that is predicated upon the duty
of care is appropriate. But deference does not mean abdication.
Auerbach represents judicial abdication; Zapata represents judicial
deference.
There are relatively few cases involving the duty of care in the last
quarter century in which directors have been held liable.109 The most
famous of these is Smith v. Van Gorkom where the board authorized
the sale of a company after listening to a twenty minute unsupported
oral presentation by the CEO and authorized the execution of a
merger agreement which had been seen by neither the board nor the
CEO.110 The documents, which had been drafted in a three-day
period by the attorney for the buyer, were executed on the evening of
the board meeting at the Lyric Opera."'
The Van Gorkom case, which never would have seen the light of day
if a special litigation committee had had the opportunity to dismiss it,
had two beneficial effects. First, and more obviously, the corporation
was given a remedy against the directors for their abject failure to
engage in an appropriately deliberative process. The board foreclosed
the possibility of a better price from the current bidder or a new bidder
by allowing itself to be intimidated into a precipitate decision.112 The
107. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988).
108. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1981); HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES,
SELECTING CORPORATE DIRECTORS 4 (1966); Statement of the Business Roundtable, supra note
34, at 2105.
109. See supra notes 89-90.
110. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
111. Id. at 869.
112. In Van Gorkom, two other bidders tentatively entered the picture. One, GE Credit, was
prepared to offer $2 to $5 more per share than Pritzker but was discouraged by the structure of
the Pritzker deal, id. at 885, while the other, KKR, withdrew when Van Gorkom apparently
dissuaded senior management from participating in a senior management/KKR proposed
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Delaware Supreme Court later suggested that, when a company is to
be sold, it should be put up for bid113 unless the sale is part of a thor-
oughly deliberated business plan, 1 which the situation in Van
Gorkom certainly was not.
More importantly, Van Gorkom sensitized the business community
to the fact that boards of directors do have deliberative responsibili-
ties. It generated a plethora of law review and business journal arti-
cles. 15  The fiascoes in the savings and loan crisis certainly
demonstrate that boards needed to be reawakened to their responsibili-
ties. In a perfect world, shareholder derivative suits to keep manage-
ment on its toes would not be necessary. But again, the savings and
loan crisis demonstrates that we do not live in a perfect world.
While Zapata is an appropriate approach when the first-tier activity
implicates the duty of care, even Zapata is inappropriate where the
challenged transaction involves director self-dealing or other duty of
loyalty violations. As discussed above, directors have no particular
expertise with duty of loyalty issues.' 16 Indeed, as the next section will
discuss, 11 7 directors, because of structural bias, are ill-equipped to pass
judgment on their fellow directors.
The dismissal of litigation is essentially a judicial function. Circum-
scribing the normal functioning of the courts ought to be done with
caution. In duty of care cases, courts have recognized the limitations
of their competence and authority vis-a-vis the competence of business
decision makers to address the operational aspects of a business-thus,
the business judgment rule. No such disparity of competence exists in
the duty of loyalty area. As the Maine Supreme Court has stated:
[tihe business judgment rule does not, however, protect business deci-
sions that result from fraud or bad faith. The policy reasons for keeping
a court from evaluating after the fact the wisdom of a particular busi-
leveraged buyout. Id. at 884-85. In a later and equally famous Delaware case involving
competing bidders, the negotiations opened at $40 and bidding finally closed at $57. Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
113. Revlon, Inc, 506 A.2d at 182 ("[When] the breakup of [a] company is inevitable... [t]he
duty of the board . . . change[s] from the preservation of [the] corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit.).
114. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.21 1140 (Del. 1989) (In
evaluating a bid, a company is entitled to evaluate long term versus short term investment
goals.).
115. A search of the Index to Legal Periodicals (on-line) for law review articles dealing with
Smith v. Van Gorkom produced 29 articles. Similarly, a search of the Business Periodical Index
dealing with corporate directors and liability in the period of 1985 to 1986 produced 13 articles
dealing with Van Gorkom.
116. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 122-55 and accompanying text.
100
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ness decision do not apply when the issue is whether a party to that
decision acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The assessment of fraud or
bad faith is a function courts are accustomed to perform, and in per-
forming it the courts do not intrude upon the process of business deci-
sionmaking beyond assuring that those decisions are not improperly
motivated."1 "
C. Policy Reasons to Distinguish Duty of Care from Duty of Loyalty
Cases
Strong policy reasons exist for differentiating between litigation
involving the duty of care and that involving the duty of loyalty. 1 9 If
a court did not decide cases involving the duty of loyalty, there would
be no external mechanism holding fiduciaries accountable. In the duty
of care area, presumably any substantial deviation from sound busi-
ness judgment will ultimately impact the bottom line and market
forces will hold the managers accountable.
While the same argument could be made with respect to violations
of the duty of loyalty, the director who has abused his position of trust
through self-dealing has already received a benefit that will probably
outweigh any discipline the market may impose. For example, in the
Zapata case, the action of the directors in advantaging themselves
deprived the corporation of the cash flow that the deduction would
have produced for the corporation, but did not impact the earnings of
the corporation.1 20 In fact, their action enhanced the earnings by
reducing expenses, but also reduced corporate cash flow. Will the
market make such a fine distinction? Even if it does, all shareholders
will pay the price of a market decline, whereas the benefit will accrue
to a handful of inside directors.
Another reason to distinguish between the two types of litigation is
that almost any corporate transaction can be challenged on duty of
care grounds. With respect to any particular decision of the board, it
may be very difficult to distinguish "bad decisions" from "bad
luck." '' Duty of loyalty litigation is much more precise. There must
be a transaction with or advantage to a director. Although the specter
of injunctive relief in an operating transaction could be horrendous
because of the disruption to operations, the potential negative impact
on the corporation is much more circumscribed when the basis for the
118. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 353 (Me. 1988) (citations omitted).
119. See generally A.L.I. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 8, supra note 40, at 121-25.
120. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980).
121. Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation:
Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAw. 503, 530-31 (1989).
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litigation is an improper benefit to a director. In this latter situation,
the corporation could receive adverse publicity or management could
be subject to the inconvenience of discovery, but this hardly brings
operations to a halt.
The final policy reason involves the integrity of the system. In the
duty of care area, investors necessarily take risks regarding the success
of the investment. The price that they pay is a function of those risks.
But a breach of trust is not a risk for which they bargain. In this area,
judicial oversight is necessary to preserve confidence in the system,
particularly when structural bias is a real concern. If directors are the
guardians of corporate integrity, sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?-
who will watch the watchmen?
V. STRUCTURAL BIAS
A. Judicial Recognition of Structural Bias
The decisions which have rejected the Auerbach deference to the
business judgment of the members of a special litigation committee
have done so predicated, at least in part, upon a concern for structural
bias. Since structural bias exists irrespective of whether the underly-
ing issue is a duty of care or a duty of loyalty problem, it is reasonable
to inquire why the existence of structural bias supports distinguishing
between duty of care and duty of loyalty cases in terms of the power of
a special litigation committee to dismiss a derivative suit. The basic
response to this inquiry is that caution must be taken before ousting
the courts from jurisdiction over an alleged wrong in an area-duty of
loyalty-in which they have been historically involved, in favor of a
body-the special litigation committee-which has neither the compe-
tence nor the independence and disinterestedness of the courts in eval-
uating the alleged duty of loyalty violation.
Structural bias, according to one court, means that supposedly
independent members of special litigation committees nonetheless are
not free from "personal, financial or moral influences which flow from
the directors who appoint them."' 22 As stated earlier in the discussion
of Zapata, it is the "there but for the grace of God go I" syndrome
which exists when directors pass judgment on their fellow directors. 23
Often the defendant directors will have been responsible for the com-
mittee members' initial appointment or election to the board and also
for their appointment to the special litigation committee. It is rare
122. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa 1983).
123. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
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that the chief executive officer is not one of the defendants and, even in
corporations which have an independent nominating committee, the
influence of the chief executive on the composition of the board of
directors is substantial. 1
24
One of the more recent state supreme courts to consider the issue of
deference to special litigation committees withdrew its earlier decision
following Auerbach and instead adopted a modified Zapata approach.
In so doing, the court stated:
We interpret the trend away from Auerbach among other jurisdictions
as an indication of growing concern about the deficiencies inherent in a
rule giving great deference to the decisions of a corporate committee
whose institutional symbiosis with the corporation necessarily affects its
ability to render a decision that fairly considers the interest of plaintiffs
forced to bring suit on behalf of the corporation. 1
25
On the other hand, the corporate bar views the idea of structural
bias as a "relatively silly, but harmless, academic argument."' 126 The
notion of structural bias is challenged with the following argument:
Those who are chosen as outside directors of publicly held corporations
are generally persons who have distinguished themselves in some other
capacity. Chief executive officers of other corporations seem to be espe-
cially prized as outside directors. Generally speaking, then, outside
directors tend to be men and women who have considerable investments
in reputation but who have invested most of their human capital else-
where. The structural bias argument asks us to believe that outside
directors generally are more willing to risk reputation and future income
than they are to risk the social embarrassment of calling a colleague to
account. 1
27
This argument misperceives the nature of structural bias. Structural
bias is not concerned with conscious decision making processes,
although one court has stated that "if the involved directors expected
any result other than a recommendation of termination at least as to
them, they would probably never establish the committee."' 128 The
empirical data seem to support this cynical view since a special litiga-
tion committee, "once formed, has almost invariably recommended
124. THE NOMINATING COMMrrrEE, supra note 32, at 24-25, 28-29.
125. Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 326 (N.C. 1987).
126. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 121, at 535-36.
127. Id. at 535 (footnote omitted).
128. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982).
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dismissal of the action against all defendants."' 29 While strike suits do
exist, it is statistically improbable that all suits brought against direc-
tors are unfounded.
B. Structural Bias as a Function of Predisposition
The concept of structural bias primarily recognizes the unconscious
elements of decision making. It proceeds on the basis that members of
the committee are not evil but biased. Bias is not used here in a nega-
tive or pejorative sense; rather it is used in the sense of inclination or
predisposition. Predisposition in turn derives from background or
relationships. Consider the many law schools that have abandoned
honor codes and turned instead to monitored exams because students
would not report other students who were cheating. This does not
mean that the silent students themselves would cheat, or that they
condone cheating, or that they fail to realize that cheating in others
disadvantages themselves competitively, or that they fail to realize that
cheaters bring disrepute to the legal profession. Butt the ethic of the
group is that you don't rat on your friends. 130
In general, the business community looks askance! at derivative liti-
gation. The overwhelming percentage of directors would meet the test
of Caesar's wife. Yet all have a concern over being sued.' And all
have felt the impact of derivative litigation as premiums for directors'
and officers' liability insurance increased slightly over 500% in 198632
and over 200% in 1987.113 Under these circumstances, it would be
incredible if directors did not have a general bias against derivative
litigation.
Directors, however, also have predispositions stemming from their
general backgrounds and relationships with each other. Despite all
the rhetoric about the importance of seeking people from a variety of
129. A.L.I. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 8, supra note 40, at 161; see also Alford v. Shaw, 324
S.E.2d 878, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Not one committee, in all these instances, has decided
to proceed with suit."); Cox, supra note 40, at 963.
130. For a number of years, in teaching material about special litigation committees, I found
that students generally regarded such committees positively and questoned the significance of
structural bias. For the past couple of years, I have introduced the material with a hypothetical
situation that a student was cheating on an examination question; I then poll my students as to
who would inform me of the incident they had supposedly seen. As a result of this practice, two
results are clear: (1) few students would turn in another student, and (2) almost all students now
accept the concept of structural bias.
131. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 106, at 1 ("[e]ight of nine participants [in the
survey] would not serve on a board that did not offer D&O liability insurance").
132. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD 1 (1986).
133. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 106, at 1.
104
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backgrounds when selecting directors,1 34 directors are a very homoge-
neous group. In the latest Heidrick & Struggles survey, 92.2% of
directors were white males and this number has been fairly constant
over the years.1 35 Ninety-four percent are fifty or older.136 In a 1982
study, 93% were college graduates and 57% had advanced degrees. 137
The "old-boy" network is still a significant factor in recruiting new
directors, 138 and the chief executive of a corporation has the key role
in selecting board members, 139 many of whom will be chief executives
of other companies." In choosing directors:
[An] overriding consideration is that the board nominee's personality
should be compatible with that of the current directors. Indeed, the new
board member is expected not only to work within the group's collective
views of the corporate interest, but also to cooperate with other board
members in reaching decisions by group consensus. Individuals who are
quarrelsome, disagreeable, or rigid are disfavored: they fail to fit within
the desired mold of "loyal independence" by which management is
given the benefit of the doubt. 141
Similarly, in explaining why outside directors have been ineffectual
in controlling the compensation of chief executive officers or in ensur-
ing that there is a correlation between compensation and corporate
performance, one former chief executive officer explained:
It's the dynamic within the meeting. If you are a CEO, you can co-opt
the issues. There are, let's say, 5000 names of people in the Fortune 500
boards. It's a club. They either know each other or they know of each
other, or they are there because of a friendship, or somebody else recom-
134. THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 32, at 21.
135. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 105, at 3.
136. Id. at 12.
137. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1982).
138. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 106, at 15.
139. THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 32.
140. Id. at 24. In the 1989 proxy statement of Ford Motor Co., eight of the nine outside
directors were chief executive officers.
141. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83,
91 (footnotes omitted); see also sources cited therein; Stanley Schachter, Deviation, Rejection and
Communication, 46 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 190 (1951). As to the coziness that has
existed on many boards of directors, see Bryan Burrough, Wimps in the Board Room, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 12, 1992, at A10; Alison L. Cowan, The High-Energy Board Room, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 1992, at Cl ("[T]he awakening of the once sleepy G.M. board will redefine the cozy
relationship that often exists between the nation's top executives and the hand-picked members
of their boards.").
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mended them. And you rarely tell the CEO that he is full of it. You
don't rock the boat. It's like that on board after board.' 42
Thus, from their background and the nature of the selection process,
there is a strong tendency for directors to think alike.
In the normal business context, such like-thinking is not necessarily
a problem. The collective wisdom of a group of directors, however,
often will not approximate the value stance of other groups or the
community at large. For example, in Zapata, the board advanced the
exercise date for options by twelve days so that the management direc-
tors could exercise their options when the fair market value of the
shares was $18.50, six days before the corporation announced a tender
offer at $25.143 This saved the executives almost $4C0,000 but cost the
corporation an even larger amount. 144
This action could be rationalized on several bases. It could be
viewed as additional compensation to the executives. One study
reported that "CEO's who sit on each others' compensation commit-
tees tend to support each others' pay raises rather than take an objec-
tive or challenging stance."' 145 It could also be rationalized on the
basis that the directors could have postponed the self-tender for twelve
days. However, if the market changed in the interim, the corporation
might have been hurt. Thus, the directors were protecting the corpo-
ration against a market rise by accelerating the options rather than
deferring the tender. But this begs the question: did they have the
right in the first place to defer the tender for their own advantage?
What would be the response of a labor leader to any purported justi-
fication for the benefit given to the management directors? How
would that labor leader respond to the argument that the corporation
is doing well and the acceleration of the options is only a little extra
bonus? The board does not tear up an existing three.-year contract and
prepare a new one at a higher wage rate for the employees when the
economy picks up and the corporation's profits increase. The union
leader would expect such a suggestion to be greeted with the response
that "a contract is a contract." Were the union leader to be appointed
to a special litigation committee, he or she might find the conduct of
the directors in advantaging themselves at the expense of the corpora-
142. Executive Pay (A Special Report): Salary Scales View from the Top: Three Former or
Current CEOs Ponder Pay at the Highest Levels, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1990, at RI 1 [hereinafter
Executive Pay].
143. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254-55 (Del. Ch. 1980).
144. See supra note 100.
145. JEREMY BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: THE COMPENSATION
COMMITTEE, CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT No. 829, at 20 (1982).
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tion reprehensible.' 46 Why, the union leader might ask, should the
corporation lose a tax benefit so that management can pay less taxes?
But there is no reasonable likelihood that either a union leader, or a
person of similar persuasion, would be appointed to such a committee.
C. Structural Bias as a Function of Group Dynamics
Predisposition is only one facet of structural bias. In addition to the
fact that directors may have a value stance not shared by the rest of
the population, directors of any particular corporation also constitute
a group, specifically, what social psychologists call a "small group."
Whenever a "group" exists, a "bonding" process evolves, together
with "in-group" bias and "out-group" prejudice. While corporate
lawyers tend to view these notions as silly, all one need do is observe
ten teenagers shooting free throws for the purpose of dividing them-
selves into two teams to understand this idea's legitimacy. The first
five to make a free throw constitute a team. While they may have had
no prior relationship, an immediate bonding occurs. Members of the
team support each other as to whether or not one of them was fouled,
or touched the ball before it went out of bounds. When the game is
over, the losing five will console each other, often over a beverage,
telling each other they would have won had the other team played
fairly.
The social psychology research consistently demonstrates that
"groups of people readily segregate themselves on meager pretexts and
quickly develop loyalties and patterns of favoritism toward others with
whom they are arbitrarily grouped.""14 Part of the explanation for
this phenomenon is that:
[P]eople like to be right and.., one's attitudinal certainty increases to
the extent that one sees one's beliefs as shared by others. The tendency
to perceive agreement and avoid discrepancy between oneself and other
in-group members is strongest when the dimensions of comparison are
important, when membership in the group is desirable or undeniable, or
when one cannot easily leave the group or change the opinions of its
members. 148
All these factors promoting bias are inherent in the special litigation
committee context. Great antipathy exists between directors and
146. One labor leader has stated, "If there is a rationale for this [the rise in CEO pay] other
than greed, we are mystified as to what it is." John A. Byrne, The Flap Over Executive Pay, Bus.
WK., May 6, 1991, at 90, 91.
147. Rolf Holtz & Norman Miller, Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes-Assumed
Similarity and Opinion Certainty, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 890, 890 (1985).
148. Id. (references omitted).
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derivative suit plaintiffs. '49 Although litigation against directors has
somewhat dampened the enthusiasm for holding corporate director-
ship, nomination to a board of directors has, nonetheless, been charac-
terized by the foremost authority on boards as "a little bit like being
knighted."15 Service on the board of another corporation can provide
rich dividends for a corporate executive. In addition to the prospect of
"enlightening glimpses of self-analysis and comparison with his
peers, '  other substantial benefits exist:
Through such service, executives gain broader insight into trends in
finance, technology, marketing, and other fields of interest to their firm.
Moreover, exposure to another firm's problems can provide advance
warning of potential problem areas in their own firm, as well as insight
into the strengths of contrasting management styles. Finally, associa-
tion with other executives on the board provides a reassuring and infor-
mal environment for candid discussions about issues at the executive's
own corporation. These discussions cannot always be carried out as
openly or in as relaxed an environment with that executive's own direc-
tors or management team, as they can with associates on another corpo-
ration's board. 152
Finally, leaving the board, particularly for a director who has been
appointed or elected to the board in order to serve on a special litiga-
tion committee, would be awkward at best, since it could be viewed as
tantamount to finding culpability on the part of the defendants. In
addition, given the homogeneity of the board, changing the group
mind-set is unlikely. Directors who discover after a few attempts that
their views are not favorably received by their colleagues either stop
raising unpopular points of view or withdraw from the board.1
51
149. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
150. MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 88 (1971).
151. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 141, at 95.
152. Id. at 95-96; see also JEREMY BACON & JAMES K. BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP
PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD, CONFERENCE BOARD
REPORT No. 646, at 57-58 (1975).
153. In the Bacon and Brown study, noted above, the authors state:
One must take note of another strand in the complex and untidy fabric of directorial
accountability. In many firms directors are, in a very real sense, accountable to
management, even though the law and management theory have it the other way around.
Management, first of all, effectively controls, or can effectively control, the selection of
directors. Management also determines what the board will do-the issues and questions
that will come before it, the extent to which exploration and discussion of them will take
place in the boardroom.
And if a director seems to the chief executive to be deficient, the chief executive can ask
for, and get, his resignation. It is the chief executive, moreover, who himself defines
deficiency: whether it is poor attendance at meetings; failure to cLo homework between
meetings; or a proclivity to ask tough, possibly embarrassing questions. Unless the board
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The strength of in-group bonding is a function of the "familiarity"
of the in-group members. "In the context of the shareholder suit, sev-
eral forces are at work that cause the directors to identify themselves
and the defendants as a discrete group and the plaintiff as a disfavored
outgroup."' 15 4 Both the defendant directors and the other directors
will have worked with each other over a period of time, possibly years,
on general board and committee matters. Even directors who were
appointed after the derivative suit was filed will work with the defend-
ant directors on non-derivative suit matters while the investigation is
pending-a period which may span many months. 155
D. The Corporate Bar's Mission to Repudiate Structural Bias
The argument has been made that there is no need to disqualify a
director for structural bias because a court will be able to determine
any actual bias in deciding whether the director is independent.' 56
Members of the corporate bar show little concern for the possibility of
bias that can not be clearly demonstrated. The proposed amendments
to the Model Business Corporation Act would not even disqualify a
director who voted in favor of a transaction from serving upon a spe-
cial litigation committee to determine whether litigation challenging
that transaction should be dismissed, so long as the director himself
received no personal benefit from the transaction. 157
insists that it have a position of primacy in the selection and evaluation of individual
directors, it will, in fact, be management that holds directors accountable. This is not to say
that management should do this. But it is to say that, not uncommonly, managements do in
fact do this.
BACON & BROWN, supra note 152, at 10.
154. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 141, at 103.
155. In the leading analysis of the effect of familiarity in the corporate context, Cox and
Munsinger conclude:
Consequently, the judges and those to be judged associate on a regular basis in discharging
their many tasks as corporate directors during the preliminary derivative suit skirmishes. In
doing so, they share a mutual duty to serve the corporate interest, and they often adopt a
common view of that corporate interest. Analogous studies suggest that the effect of these
shared experiences is not only to bond the directors and the defendants together but also to
form a basis upon which the directors can be expected to give greater weight to the
defendant's values, attitudes, and perceptions than to those of outgroup members like the
plaintiff. Indeed, the greater the interaction between the defendants and directors, in terms
of frequency and degree of task complexity, the stronger the favoritism the directors can be
expected to express toward the defendants.
Id. at 103-04 (footnotes omitted). This article was relied upon by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in withdrawing an opinion following Auerbach and instead following a modified Zapata
approach. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
156. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-
Amendments Pertaining to Derivative Proceedings, 44 Bus. LAWv. 543, 551-52 (1989).
157. See id. at 550 (proposed MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.44(c)(3)).
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Thus, in Zapata, where the board accelerated the exercise date of
options so that the senior officers gained, and the corporation lost,
about $400,000,t5 the four outside directors voted in favor of the
action and one of the four inside directors, who attended the meeting
to provide a quorum, abstained. 159 But, under the Model Act propo-
sal, the same four outside directors who voted for the transaction
could be constituted as a special litigation committee and vote to dis-
miss the action. In such a case, the court would be required to dismiss
the action, assuming the directors (i) in good faith (ii) conducted a
reasonable inquiry (iii) from which they concluded that continuing the
derivative suit was not in the best interests of the corporation. If these
four outside directors were a majority of the board (for example, if the
board were a seven person board instead of eight), under the Model
Act proposal, the plaintiff would have had the burden of proving that
one of the above three elements was not met.
The Model Act proposal places an almost insurmountable burden
on the derivative plaintiff. The special litigation committee can always
orchestrate a reasonable investigation. Since the questionable pay-
ments cases of the 1970s, serving as counsel for special litigation com-
mittees has become a sub-specialty for large corporate law firms.
Inasmuch as they are paid by the hour, exhaustive interviews and
voluminous paper is the order of the day.1" And, somewhere in such
a record, there will probably be some shred of evidence to justify the
committee's conclusion, particularly when the costs of litigation are
taken into account.
Thus, the issues under the Model Act proposal and under Auerbach
become the good faith and independence, respectively, of the commit-
tee. While plaintiffs can challenge the good faith and independence of
158. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
159. Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 792 (2nd Cir. 1979).
160. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Del. 1985):
To help Holliday and Marshall with their investigation, Special Litigation Committee
retained the firm of Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell and Petty (Brown, Wood) as the
Committee's counsel and Ernst and Whinney as independent outside accountants. Neither
firm had prior dealings with Coastal.
In the course of their investigation, the Litigation Committee interviewed 140 people
throughout the world, including 49 employees and 25 people who had no connection with
Coastal. Coastal's officers and in-house counsel gathered some of the documents used in the
investigation and were present at some of the interviews. At each of these interviews
attorneys from Brown, Wood were present and took handwritten notes. Following the
interviews, the handwritten notes were transcribed into typewritten memos, and then the
handwritten notes were destroyed. Brown, Wood received in the vicinity of $500,000 for its
efforts in fees and reimbursements.
The committee moved to dismiss the litigation.
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the committee members, "the subtle pressures directed towards these
directors daily are hardly susceptible to quantification and proof. Loy-
alty, friendship, and obligation among the directors may exist, but it is
impossible to show conclusively that these influences affected the
[committee]... decision." '' If the plaintiff has the burden of proof,
demonstrating lack of independence, particularly a lack of indepen-
dence stemming from structural bias, will be incredibly difficult, intru-
sive, and costly. It will be necessary to delve into a director's private
relationships and personal history.
Thus, the plaintiff's last hope will be to challenge the good faith of
the committee.' 62 When respectable businessmen and businesswomen
are appointed to the committee, however, courts will hesitate to chal-
lenge their good faith. In effect, the wrong people are being brought to
trial: the courts should be reviewing the conduct of the defendants, not
the conduct of the members of the special litigation committee.
The impact of the lobbying efforts' 63 of the corporate bar and the
Business Roundtable can be seen in the evolution of the American
Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project. The Discussion Draft
161. Marc S. Joseph, Note, Special Litigation Committees: An Unwelcome Solution to
Shareholder Demands, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 510.
162. See, eg., Peller v. The Southern Co., 707 F. Supp. 525, 529 (N.D. Ga. 1988). In Peller,
the committee had counsel conduct the interviews and then provide the committee with
summaries. The committee then denied plaintiff access to the interviews on the basis that they
were privileged. The court held that "by relying on counsel to outline and to conduct all
interviews and then prepare interview summaries that contain 'privileged information,' the ILC
has insulated its investigation from scrutiny by plaintiff. This is not good faith." Id.
163. According to the chairman of the Lawyers Steering Committee Corporate Governance
Task Force of the Business Roundtable, "[n]otwithstanding vigorous efforts by corporate counsel
and many outside practitioners, the Project continues to contain provisions which would reduce
the authority of directors to deal with important issues affecting the corporation and expose them
to significantly greater risk of liability and litigation." Clifford L. Whitehill, The American Law
Institute Tentatively Approves Part VI of Its Corporate Governance Project, in THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT IN MID-PASSAGE-WHAT WILL IT
MEAN TO YOU? 113 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 1991). The lobbying effort
with respect to changes in control was summarized as follows:
On May 16 and 17, 1990 during its Annual Meeting, the membership of the American
Law Institute again considered its Corporate Governance Project. The results represented a
major victory for good corporate governance. Part VI of the draft considered at the
meeting, which relates to tender offers and transactions in control, was significantly
changed. The board's power to deal with hostile takeovers was greatly enhanced. This
improvement in the Draft was achieved as a result of the adoption of proposals made by
members of CORPRO (The American Bar Association Business Section's official liaison
with the ALl).
The ALI plays a major role in setting the course for future legal developments.
Unfortunately, it operates on the town meeting principle, only those who turn out for the
Annual Meetings are entitled to vote. Since only about two hundred fifty members normally
attend the working sessions at the Annual Meetings out of a total membership of
approximately three thousand, the votes are frequently not reflective of the views of the total
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promulgated in 1985, dealing with derivative suits, provided that a
"court should have authority to dismiss a derivative action ' 1 against
an officer or director if disinterested directors, after reasonable investi-
gation and submission of a particularized report to the court, find that
the report substantiates one of the following bases for dismissal:
(1) The likelihood of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is remote;
(2) The value of the potential relief, discounted for the likelihood of
success and determined with respect to each defendant separately, does
not clearly exceed the corporation's probable out-of-pocket costs for
continuing the action against that defendant; (3) Before the commence-
ment of the action, the corporation had itself undertaken appropriate
corrective or disciplinary action with respect to the subject matter of the
action; or (4) The balance of corporate interests warrants dismissal of
the action, regardless of its merits.16
5
This does not appear to be a stridently pro-shareholder, anti-director
provision, but rather an attempt at balance.
The comments in the 1985 Discussion Draft dealt gently with the
structural bias issue, stating that "at a minimum, it must be recog-
nized that the nature of a decision made by such a [special litigation]
committee is unique and sensitive" and that "[t]o permit an otherwise
well-pleaded action to be dismissed without substantive judicial review
of the reasons for* dismissal would seem strikingly at odds with the
basic premises of our system of civil procedure."'' 6,5
However, in 1988, the balance began to shift. The concept of "uni-
versal demand" was introduced by the American Law Institute's Ten-
tative Draft No. 8, requiring a plaintiff in a derivative suit to make
demand on the board of directors even if all board members were
interested in the questioned transaction, thereby eliminating the "futil-
membership. In 1990 CORPRO made a major effort to improve attendance. The results
were gratifying-more than one hundred additional members voted on key issues.
Id. at 114 (footnote omitted). The lobbying efforts apparently continued with respect to director
control over derivative litigation. See ALl Wraps Up Corporation Law Project, 60 U.S.L.W.
2727, 2728 (Gen. Law May 26, 1992).
164. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.08, at 95 (Discussion Draft. No. 1, 1985) (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 96. The proposal also would have permitted the court to consider countervailing
evidence submitted by plaintiff and would preclude dismissal if dismissal would frustrate any
legal rule that operates for the protection of shareholders. Id.
166. Id. at 103; see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 113-14 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1986). In
Tentative Draft No. 6, the discretion of the court was circumscribed by changing the language
"should have authority" (see emphasized language in text at note 164) simply to "should." Id. at
106.
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ity" exception.'67 This draft also provided that, in duty of care cases,
the court "should accept any findings and conclusions [of the special
litigation committee] as to business matters, unless the plaintiff estab-
lishes that such findings and conclusions are so clearly unreasonable as
to fall outside the bounds of the directors' discretion."' 168
Although the foregoing changes from the 1985 Discussion Draft
reflected a shift in favor of defendant directors, from the perspective of
at least some members of the corporate bar, the ALI reporters were
still engaged in "reform" rather than restatement. In fact, the report-
ers were analogized to the Bellman in Lewis Caroll's poem, The Hunt-
ing of the Snark, because they allegedly asserted that the law is what
they say it is.169 However, the very article that takes the reporters to
task is guilty of the same crime because its view of what is the "law" is
in fact based, first, on Delaware law (as if Delaware law were the only
law that mattered) and, second, upon an incomplete reading of Dela-
ware law at that.170
Nevertheless, the business campaign to circumscribe derivative liti-
gation by empowering supposedly "disinterested" directors bore fruit
in the Proposed Final Draft.17  In the final draft, the concept of struc-
tural bias is substantially circumscribed and the burden required to
establish it is extremely difficult. When fellow directors act to dismiss
a derivative suit, usually through a special litigation committee, all the
Proposed Final Draft requires is that any director who is a member of
the committee not be "interested" and that the directors "as a group"
be capable of objective judgment in the circumstances.172 A director is
interested if he or she (i) has a "business, financial, or familial relation-
ship" with the defendant, other than service on the board of directors,
(ii) which "would reasonably be expected to affect [the director's]
167. A.L.I. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 8, supra note 40, § 7.03, at 63-64, 70-71. Judge
Easterbrook was recently reversed by the Supreme Court when he attempted to create a federal
"universal demand" standard. See supra note 14.
168. A.L.I. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 8, supra note 40, § 7.08(c), at 115-16 (emphasis added).
169. Charles Hansen et a]., The Role of Disinterested Directors in "Conflict" Transactions: The
ALI Corporate Governance Project and Existing Law, 45 Bus. LAWv. 2083, 2083-84 (1990). In
defense of the reporters, the law was certainly not settled at this time (nor is it today) and the
position taken by the reporters in the A.L.I. Discussion Draft No. I was probably closer to a
restatement than the position taken by the corporate bar. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d
Cir. 1982).
170. See Hansen et al., supra note 169, at 2090-97; see also Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d
400 (Del. 1987) (which only provides that disinterested approvals change the burden of proof;
they do not create a safe harbor); cf infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
171. A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 5.
172. Id. § 7.09(a)(1).
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judgment... in a manner adverse to the corporation."' 7 3 Because the
plaintiff, under the Proposed Final Draft, has the burden of proving
interest,174 and because the plaintiff also has the burden of particular-
ized pleading 175 without benefit of discovery, 17 6 the burden on the
plaintiff is indeed a heavy one. Moreover, according to the commen-
tary, "[a] director may have a significant relationship with senior exec-
utives of a corporation and still be disinterested ....
The Proposed Final Draft also imposes a specific "particularized"
pleading requirement upon the plaintiff, thereby rejecting notice plead-
ing.'7 1 In Delaware, a derivative plaintiff felt the sting of "particular-
ized" pleading when the Delaware Supreme Court held that an
allegation that a forty-seven percent shareholder in a public corpora-
tion, "having selected each director, controls and dominates every
member of the board," was not sufficiently particularized. 79
173. Id. § 1.23.
174. Id. §§ 4.01(d), 5.02(b).
175. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
176. See ALI Wraps Up Corporation Law Project, supra note 163, at 2728. An amendment
providing that "the court may, for good cause, permit limited discovery concerning whether the
directors who rejected the demand were disinterested" was rejected. The vote was 216 for and
297 against, which shows the value of the lobbying efforts to induce members sympathetic to the
views of corporate counsel to attend the meeting. Id. The subject of limited discovery was
discussed at length by the chancellor in Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 510-11 (Del. Ch. 1984):
Also as a practical matter, experience shows (as it did here) that the plaintiff will attempt
to seek all the discovery that he could possibly hope to obtain if he were seeking discovery
on the merits of the allegations of the complaint. And why not? He certainly has nothing to
lose by asking. And he has arguable justification. How can he test fully the reasonableness
and good faith of the Committee's investigation unless he looks at each and every document
reviewed by the Committee and unless he takes his own deposition of each person
interviewed by the Committee so as to compare the Committee's findings with his own?
And why should he not have access even to documents that were not examined by the
Committee? Certainly, if he can turn up something of substance that was ignored by the
Committee, it will support his argument that the recommendation of the Committee should
not be honored. Of course, such all-encompassing discovery is not within the spirit of
Zapata since its mandate contemplates only such discovery as fits the occasion in the view of
the Court.
In any event, the "limited discovery" request of the plaintiff takes on particular
significance since that which he gets-which in all probability will be something less than all
he wants-will constitute the framework on which he must defend :he motion initiated by
the Special Litigation to have his derivative suit dismissed. Again, after assimilating a
lengthy factual report, the Court must hear the parties on this issue and make the
appropriate ruling.
177. A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 5, at 32. "Sinificant relationship" is
defined in § 1.34.
178. Id. § 7.04, at 669-70; cf A.L.I. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 8, supra note 40, § 7.04, at
81-82.
179. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 809, 816-17 (Del. 1984); see infra discussion at notes
189-93.
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The Proposed Final Draft also retained the universal demand
requirement added in 1988 so that the board now can move to dismiss
the derivative suit if the plaintiff does not first make demand. 8 ' But
what if plaintiff makes a demand upon the board? According to the
ALI Proposed Final Draft: once the board's timely response is made
or a decision to conduct a lengthier study is reached, the plaintiff is
free to file the action. On the plaintiff's filing of the action, however,
the corporation may immediately move to dismiss under section 7.04
if the action fails to plead particularized facts that "raise a significant
prospect" that the defendants violated the standards set forth in these
principles, and it may seek a stay under section 7.06 of all discovery
and related efforts to prosecute the action by the plaintiff.
181
The board can also move to dismiss the action "as contrary to the
best interests of the corporation."' 182 In such a case, the directors will
file a report with the court'83 and, under the Proposed Final Draft, the
court, in reviewing the report, will generally follow an Auerbach stan-
dard in duty of care cases and a Zapata standard in duty of loyalty
cases.
18 4
However, "[v]arious ALI members objected to the reporters' propo-
sal insofar as it required a court to undertake some level of review...
regardless of the type of violation alleged."' 85 An amendment was
offered which "would have provided that a plaintiff could challenge a
board's rejection of demand only if the plaintiff alleged facts raising 'a
significant prospect that a majority of the board which rejected the
demand was interested' in the conduct or transaction complained
of.' 18 6 The intent of the amendment appears to be to impose effec-
tively a burden of proof obligation at the pleading stage on top of a
particularized pleading obligation, all without the benefit of discovery.
A compromise was offered and adopted, which, like the amendment, is
not presently available to the public, but which appears not to deviate
much from the initial amendment.18 7
However, even though the "final" proposal was adopted, there is
not yet a final draft because details on the compromise amendment
and commentary are unsettled. It seems clear, however, that the ALI
180. A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 5, § 7.05(a)(1), at 685; cf A.L.I.
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 8, supra note 40, § 7.05, at 93-94.
181. A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 5, at 659.
182. Id. § 7.05(a)(3), at 685.
183. Id. § 7.09(a)(4), at 708.
184. Id. §§ 7.10(a)(1), (2), at 725-26.
185. ALI Wraps Up Corporation Law Project, supra note 163, at 2727.
186. Id. at 2727-28.
187. Id. at 2728.
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work product will be much more acceptable to corporate counsel
because of the lobbying efforts.
VI. WHEN ARE DIRECTORS INDEPENDENT?
Courts in various jurisdictions differ markedly in the degree to
which they will scrutinize underlying facts to determine whether a
director is truly independent in a particular situation. For example,
while California, Illinois, and Massachusetts have closely scrutinized
the question of directors' independence when this criterion is an
issue, 18 Delaware courts have shut their eyes to factors that would
compromise independence in the minds of most people.
A. The Delaware Presumption of Director Independence
In Aronson v. Lewis, 189 a leading Delaware case on director indepen-
dence, the defendant, who was seventy-five-years-old and owned 47%
of the shares of each of two corporations, made a consulting agree-
ment with each corporation for substantial compensation. 190 One cor-
poration also made interest-free loans amounting to $225,000 to the
defendant. 191 The court treated the situation as a demand required
case, notwithstanding the allegation in the complaint that the defend-
ant, "having selected each director, controls and dominates every
member of the Board .... -192 The court stated:
The causal link between Fink's control and approval of the employment
agreement is alluded to, but nowhere specified. The director's approval,
alone, does not establish control, even in the face of Fink's 47% stock
ownership. The claim that Fink is unlikely to perform any services
under the agreement, because of his age, and his conflicting consultant
work with Prudential, adds nothing to the control claim. Therefore, we
cannot conclude that the complaint factually particularizes any circum-
stances of control and domination to overcome the presumption of
board independence, and thus render the demand futile.193
It is almost beyond credibility to assert that a 47% shareholder of a
publicly held corporation does not control the board of directors. For
such control not to exist, over 90% of the public shareholders would
need to attend the shareholders' meeting and unanimously vote
against the 47% shareholder. It is common knowledge that it is
188. See infra notes 200-15 and accompanying text.
189. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
190. Lewis v. Aronson, 466 A.2d 375, 379-80 (Del. Ch. 1983).
191. Id at 380.
192. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 809.
193. Id at 816-17 (citation and footnote omitted).
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almost impossible to obtain the presence of 90% of the public share-
holders. That is why management, over time, has lobbied to reduce
the vote for mergers and other organic changes from two-thirds to a
mere majority and why quorum requirements for annual shareholder
meetings can now be reduced to one-third in most states. Yet, Dela-
ware treats a pleading which alleges control by a 47% shareholder as
insufficient.
The following year, in Kaplan v. Wyatt, 19 4 the Delaware Supreme
Court again considered the issue of director independence. In Kaplan,
a derivative suit charging self-dealing was brought against Oscar S.
Wyatt, Jr., the founder, chairman of the board, and chief executive
officer of Coastal Corporation.'" Marshall, a director on the special
litigation committee which had moved to dismiss the suit, was, along
with members of his family, a 16% owner of a company which did
$266 million of business with Coastal and which had sold to Coastal
the oil tanker that was one of the subjects of the self-dealing allega-
tions.' 9 6 Marshall was also a 50% shareholder in an oil exploration
operation in which Coastal had invested large sums of money.
197
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the court concluded:
In our recent decision of Aronson v. Lewis, we stated that a director is
independent when he is in a position to base his decision on the merits of
the issue rather than being governed by extraneous considerations or
influences. As we noted, it is the care, attention and sense of individual
responsibility to the performance of one's duties that touch on indepen-
dence .... Kaplan, however, fails to show how any of [the alleged]
factors were such an influence on Marshall or the Committee that they
prevented them from basing their decisions on the corporate merits of
the issues.' 9 8
Thus, according to the Delaware court, independence, and presum-
ably good faith, are not a function of relationships, but rather a func-
tion of going through the proper rituals to create the illusion of
attention to duty. Independence is almost conclusively presumed.
B. Other Jurisdictions Take a More Realistic View of When a
Director Is Truly Independent
Other authorities are not so permissive as Delaware. The Illinois
Supreme Court has held that a subordinate officer is not an independ-
194. 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
195. Id. at 1186.
196. Id. at 1186-87.
197. Id. at 1187.
198. Id. at 1189 (citations omitted).
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ent director when passing on a transaction involving his superior, nor
is the attorney for the corporation independent.1 99 In a similar vein,
the Committee on Corporate Laws has indicated that "an employee,
director, agent, partner, close relative, or affiliate of the controlling
shareholder"" is not independent when passing on transactions
between the corporation and the controlling shareholder and that
"commercial bankers, investment bankers, attorneys, and others who
supply services or goods to the corporation"2 ' may be affiliated
directors.
In addition, Massachusetts courts appear far more skeptical of
director independence than does Delaware. Whereas Aronson held
that an allegation that the principal shareholder owned 47% of the
shares and "personally selected" each director did not suffice to excuse
demand on the basis that the directors were dominated by the share-
holder,2"2 a Massachusetts court excused demand on the basis that
"[w]e think that it can be inferred from Fisher's control of the out-
standing voting stock that the directors would have acted in a manner
favorable to his interests. '20 3
In contrast to the Kaplan case, where Delaware held that business
arrangements with the corporation in question did not impinge upon a
director's independence, 2°  a federal court, apply:aag Massachusetts
law in Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors,205 looked at long-standing
business contacts between Galvin, the director on the special litigation
committee, and Carney, a defendant and chairman of the board, and
199. Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793, 805 (Ill. 1960); see also Sarner
v. Fox Hill, Inc., 199 A.2d 6 (Conn. 1964) (vote of the defendant director's attorney was
considered to be the defendant's vote).
200. Committee on Corporate Laws, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated Director of the Controlled
Corporation, 45 Bus. LAW. 429, 434 (1989).
201. ABA Committe on Corporate Laws, supra note 33, at 1620 (footnote omitted).
202. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984).
203. Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 382 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (Mass. 1978). The two
approaches might be distinguished on the basis that the defendant in Pupecki owned 90% of the
shares while the defendant in Aronson owned 47%. Both the trial court and the state supreme
court in Aronson several times characterized defendant Fink as a "less than a majority"
shareholder. However, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that "even proof of majority
ownership of a company does not strip the directors of the presumptians of independence, and
that their acts have been taken in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation."
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815. Moreover, it is sophistry to suggest that a shareholder who holds 47%
of 1,245,745 shares does not control the directors when they vote him a compensation package
that could pay him over $1 million but such "compensation was not to be affected by any
inability to perform services ..... Id. at 809.
204. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
205. 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984).
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held that "Galvin's 'personal interests' and 'prior affiliation with the
corporation' preclude any affirmative demonstration of disinterest. '20 6
That the federal court correctly "read" Massachusetts law was con-
firmed recently by the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision in
Houle v. Low. 20 7 In Houle, the supreme court reversed the summary
judgment entered by the lower court, even though the supreme court
found no evidence that Dr. McKee, the director who constituted the
special litigation committee, acted in less than good faith.218  The
plaintiff had challenged the independence of the director on the basis
of "Dr. McKee's junior role ... as the youngest of the participating
physicians and stockholders . . . . her professional association with
them, her business connections with them, and her dependency on
them for future economic success. '20 9 The supreme court responded:
Although typically there are relationships among directors that call for
scrutiny of the independence of members of a litigation committee, Dr.
McKee's position is particularly suspect .... The pressures on Dr.
McKee to recommend dismissal of the action may have been strong.
The possible consequences to her of a contrary recommendation call for
further consideration of her independence. We cannot fairly say that,
on this record, there is no dispute of material fact as to whether the
committee was independent and unbiased.210
A California court has also rejected Delaware's position, as reflected
in the lower court's decision in Kaplan, that independence of a direc-
tor is presumed in the special litigation context. Will v. Engebretson &
206. Id. at 379. The business relationships that precluded disinterestedness were set forth by
the court as follows:
In 1968, Galvin possessed a 1/7 interest in "Cragin, Lang," a leasing and management firm.
Galvin's firm entered into a services agreement with Investment Plaza Company, of which
Carney was a partner. By 1977, Galvin had become President of "Cragin, Lang" and
Carney had become managing partner of Investment Plaza. The close business relationship
between Carney and Galvin continued after Galvin left "Cragin, Lang." When, in 1979,
Galvin became a founding principal and 25% owner of "Adler Galvin Rogers, Inc.," he
brought with him Carney's account. At the same time, leasing contracts for properties
included within Carney's investment company were transferred from "Cragin, Lang" to
"Adler Galvin Rogers."
Galvin, as a founding principal and 25% owner of a leasing and management company,
also has a keen interest in attracting real estate developers. Defendant Carney is an active
real estate developer in the Cleveland area. Furthermore, Galvin and defendant-trustee
Alfred M. Rankin are partners in Bar Associates, a firm which owns a large apartment
building in downtown Cleveland. Galvin owns a 2% interest in the building and Rankin
owns a 10% interest.
Id. at 378-79.
207. 556 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1990).
208. Id. at 58-59.
209. Id. at 58.
210. Id.
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CO., Inc.2 11 held that a plaintiff "is entitled to a trial on the merits as
opposed to a 'limited review' of the merits regarding the issue of the
good faith and independence of the committee." '2 12 At the hearing on
the corporation's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submit-
ted evidence that the so-called "'disinterested' directors were relatives
of the Engebretsons or business clients with substantial financial inter-
ests managed by Engebretson. 21 3 The Engebretson court stated that
"[b]y conducting only a limited review of the merits on the theory the
court should give deference to the business judgment of the commit-
tee, the court, in effect, lets the committee determine its own indepen-
dence and good faith." '214 Moreover, "a limited review of the merits
will tend to hide the structural bias of the special litigation
committee. ' 215
C. Recognition of Director Bias by the Business World
Not only does the presumption of impartiality which Delaware
appears to grant members of special litigation committees not accord
with judicial thinking in other states, nor with everyday experience,
nor with research into the functioning of small groups, it also does not
comport with data coming from the corporate world itself.
Conference Board studies have documented the strong influence of
senior management upon the outside directors on nominating and
compensation committees. Most significantly, a recent study showed
that less than one-half of the chief executive officers surveyed believed
that special litigation committees could render independent and unbi-
ased judgment of the merits of derivative litigation.216 Finally, one of
today's leading advocates for expansion of the powers of special litiga-
tion committees21 7 earlier recognized that "[i]f. . . all judicial review
of the merits of the committee's decision is foreclosed, there will be
very few cases where a committee, once formed and put to work judg-
ing their peers, will conclude that the litigation should proceed. '218
211. 261 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
212. Id. at 873.
213. Id. at 870.
214. Id. at 874.
215. Id.
216. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 106, at 15.
217. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 121 (E. Norman Veasey).
218. Veasey, supra note 88, at 1273.
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VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADITIONAL STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AND COMMON LAW DOCTRINE
UPON THE SCOPE OF SPECIAL LITIGATION
COMMITTEES
Most of the discussion of special litigation committees, both in judi-
cial decisions and in academic commentary, has focused on the busi-
ness judgment rule-a judge-made law. Inadequate consideration has
been given to the significance of the work of legislatures, namely, what
bearing statutory provisions have on the scope of special litigation
committees. While all statutes do authorize generally the formation of
committees,2 t9 these particular statutory provisions say little about the
scope of special litigation committees. However, numerous states,
including Delaware, though eschewing business judgment/duty of
care provisions in their statutes, have enacted statutory provisions
dealing with duty of loyalty issues, particularly with respect to situa-
tions involving conflicts of interest.
A. Conflict of Interest Statutes-Background
One of the first statutory provisions dealing with conflicts of inter-
est, and one which has been widely copied, is that of Delaware,
enacted in 1967. The Delaware law provides that a conflict of interest
transaction is not voidable, (1) if the conflict is disclosed and approved
by disinterested directors, (2) if the conflict is disclosed and approved
by shareholders, or (3) if fair.220 The purpose of section 144 was to
219. The Annotated Model Act statutory comparison states: "All jurisdictions provide for
committees of directors to be appointed by the board of directors. Two jurisdictions only refer
specifically to an executive committee: the District of Columbia and South Dakota. The
remaining fifty jurisdictions expressly refer to other committees as well." 2 MODEL BUSINESs
CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.25 (Supp. 1992) (statutory comparison).
220. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991), provides as follows:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or
officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or
other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, or
have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the
director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee
which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because his or their votes are counted
for such purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction
are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or
committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a
majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less than a
quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction
are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or
transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
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ameliorate the common law rule of "per se voidability for interested
transactions." 221
However, statutes such as section 144 present some troubling
problems of interpretation. Clauses (1) and (2) speak of approval by
either disinterested directors or by the shareholders, while clause (3)
speaks of fairness. Since all three clauses are in the disjunctive, does
this mean that disinterested director or shareholder approval222 can
validate a transaction that is unfair? An affirmative answer to this
query is suggested by the fact that, if director or shareholder approval
also requires that the transaction be fair, then clause (3) would be
superfluous. In addition, if validation by director or shareholder
action also required fairness, then the conjunction before clause (3)
should be the conjunctive "and" rather than the disjunctive "or."
Notwithstanding these textual arguments, the Delaware Supreme
Court has held that "the statute cannot 'sanction unfairness' "223 and
reconciled the procedural/fairness issue by stating that the defendant
director who seeks to uphold the conflict of interest transaction would
have the burden of proof without disinterested director or shareholder
approval whereas, with such approval, the plaintiff would have the
burden of proof.224 In other words, approval by a disinterested body
removes the presumption against the interested director and leaves the
plaintiff with the burden of proof, which is the normal incident in
litigation.
Learning from the Delaware experience, Illinois, in enacting its
1983 Business Corporation Act,225 adopted a new provision, section
8.60, dealing with conflict of interest transactions.226 The new provi-
sionfirst provides that a conflict of interest transaction is not invalid if
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized,
approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a
quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a committee which authorizes the
contract or transaction.
221. Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403 (Del. 1987).
222. While clause (2) speaks only of shareholder approval, not "disinterested" shareholder
approval, the Delaware Supreme Court held that shareholder approval which is not disinterested
does not "freshen" the transaction. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976).
223. Marciano, 535 A.2d at 404-05.
224. Id. at 405 n.3.
225. 1983 Ill. Laws 6943.
226. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.60 (Smith-Hurd 1985), provides:
(a) If a transaction is fair to a corporation at the time it is authorized, approved, or ratified,
the fact that a director of the corporation is directly or indirectly a party to the transaction
is not grounds for invalidating the transaction.
(b) In a proceeding contesting the validity of a transaction describec in subsection (a), the
person asserting validity has the burden of proving fairness unless:
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fair,2 27 and then provides that, if specified disinterested directors or
disinterested shareholders approve the transaction (having been
informed of the conflict), the plaintiff has the burden of proof.2 2 8
Thus, in Illinois, it is clear that the touchstone for validity is fairness
and that the effect of procedural approvals is to change the burden of
proof.
B. The Impact of a Conflict of Interest Statute upon the Authority
of a Special Litigation Committee to Dismiss Litigation
What is the effect of these statutory provisions upon the power or
authority of a special litigation committee to cause the dismissal of a
shareholder's derivative suit predicated on a conflict of interest?
Because the statutes provide that disinterested director approval only
changes the burden of proof, dismissing a suit on the recommendation
of a special litigation committee gives the directors' recommendation
broader effect than the legislature intended. A statute that deals with
the burden of proof contemplates a judicial determination at an evi-
dentiary hearing. Dismissal on motion of the special litigation com-
mittee short circuits any factual finding by the judiciary on the alleged
first-tier wrongdoing.
The Auerbach approach in the duty of loyalty area directly conflicts
with statutes such as Delaware's section 144 and Illinois' section 8.60
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest or relationship were
disclosed or known to the board of directors or a committee of the board and the board or
committee authorized, approved or ratified the transaction by the affirmative votes of a
majority of disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less than a
quorum; or
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest or relationship were
disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorized, approved or
ratified the transaction without counting the vote of any shareholder who is an interested
director.
The presence of the director, who is directly or indirectly a party to the transaction
described in subsection (a), or a director who is otherwise not disinterested, may be counted
in determining whether a quorum is present but may not be counted when the board of
directors or a committee of the board takes action on the transaction.
For purposes of this Section, a director is "indirectly" a party to a transaction if the other
party to the transaction is an entity in which the director has a material financial interest or
of which the director is an officer, director or general partner.
Illinois previously had its own misadventure in drafting a conflict of interest statute. A provision
adopted in 1981, § 40a, eliminated voidability solely because of the conflict if the conflict is
disclosed to either disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders and, nonetheless,
approved. 1981 Ill. Laws 3377, 3379-80. However, the new provision said nothing about fair-
ness and was thus open to the interpretation that a fair transaction could not be valid without
disinterested director or shareholder approval. Id.
227. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.60(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
228. Id. para. 8.60(b).
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since these statutes provide that the second-tier action-approval by a
committee of disinterested directors--does not foreclose judicial
review but rather only changes the burden of proof. Thus, for a judge
to apply the Auerbach standard and decline to review the merits of the
alleged first-tier breach of the duty of loyalty would amount to judicial
repeal of the conflict of interest statute.
Even the Zapata approach is inconsistent with the conflict of inter-
est statutes. While Zapata does permit the court to exercise its own
business judgment in determining whether the motion by the special
litigation committee should be granted, the flaw in the -Zapata
approach lies in the nature of the record before the court.
Under Zapata, which is a hybrid between a motion to dismiss and a
motion for summary judgment, 29 the record with which the plaintiff
is constrained is that made by the special litigation committee, subject
to plaintiff's limited right of discovery.230 Under the conflict of inter-
est statutes, however, the plaintiff, in the first instance, has the right to
make her own record. While the plaintiff has the burden of proof if
there is disinterested director approval, she has the right to call wit-
nesses and examine them and can even call defendants as adverse wit-
nesses and, in effect, cross-examine them. This is a far cry from being
stuck with the record made by a special litigation committee, with its
attendant problems of structural bias.
VIII. THE EFFECT OF DEFERENCE TO SPECIAL
LITIGATION COMMITTEES FROM A
PROCEDURAL PERSPECTIVE
In any contested matter, the resolution of the dispute is often a
function of the presence or absence of a set of procedures that assures
procedural fairness and, thus, a substantial likelihood that the "right"
decision will in fact be made. This is taken for granted in judicial
proceedings; however, even with respect to internal corporate matters
such as removal of directors, courts have required procedures that
embody at least a modicum of fundamental fairness. These minimum
standards include "service of specific charges, adequate notice and full
opportunity of meeting the accusation .... ,231 Although these are
normally thought of as defendant's rights, in the special litigation
committee context, the "power" roles are reversed and it is the plain-
229. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
230. Id. at 788; Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 510 (Del. 1984).
231. Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 859 (Del. 1957) (quoting Auer v. Dressel, 118
N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1954)).
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tiff who needs protection, particularly the full opportunity of meeting
the justifications that the committee will present to dismiss the
litigation.
In seeking to get a sense of whether a hearing is basically fair, what
factors should be examined? Essentially, one needs to know who com-
poses the hearing body, what opportunity exists for each party to
gather evidence, who is given the opportunity to present evidence,
whether evidence presented can be challenged, who has the burden of
proof, how the decision is made, by whom it is reviewable, and under
what standard. For comparison purposes, consider a claim brought by
a minority shareholder against a controlling shareholder, the president
of the corporation, who has removed substantial assets from the cor-
poration through excessive compensation or other self-dealing transac-
tions.232 If this claim were brought under traditional procedures, it
would be filed in state court before a judge who had no relationship
with either party.233 Both the plaintiff and the defendant would have
access to the discovery process, which, though subject to abuse, can
also be judicially controlled: sanctions exist for making false state-
ments or abusing the discovery process.2 34 Each side has full opportu-
nity to present evidence and to cross-examine the other party's
witnesses. Rules exist to insure that the evidence introduced is rele-
vant and reliable, and the decision must be based upon such evidence.
232. See, eg., Will v. Engebretson & Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 211-15 and infra at text accompanying notes 272-81);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes
190-93).
233. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1001(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1985) (providing for
change of venue when the judge is prejudiced). In In re Marriage of Passiales, 494 N.E.2d 541
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986), the court stated: "[t]he rationale for allowing a change of venue as a matter
of right is that a litigant is entitled to an impartial hearing." Id. at 548; accord 28 U.S.C.A. § 144
(1968) ("whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding").
234. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (which provides in
part that: "[a]llegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and found to be untrue,
shall subject the party pleading them to the payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by
the other party by reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, to be
summarily taxed by the court upon motion made within 30 days of the judgment or dismissal");
see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 219(c) (Smith-Hurd 1985) (provision for a variety of
sanctions, including contempt and entry of judgment on the issue in question, when there is
abuse of the discovery process). The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that "[olur discovery
procedures are meaningless unless a violation entails a penalty proportionate to the gravity of the
violation. Discovery for all parties will not be effective unless trial courts do not countenance
violations, and unhesitatingly impose sanctions proportionate to the circumstances." Buehler v.
Whalen, 374 N.E.2d 460, 467 (Ill. 1977); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 26(c), 37.
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The defendant president has the burden of proof235 and the decision is
made by the unbiased judge. If the judge requests suggested findings,
either the request will be extended to both parties cr the losing party
will have the opportunity to challenge the findings submitted by the
prevailing party.
If a party believes the decision of the trier of fact is wrong, an appeal
can be taken to what is usually a three judge reviewing court, and the
standard of review is whether the judgment is against the weight of the
evidence.2 36 This standard of review is in opposition to the possibly
more restrictive scope of review in administrative hearings, namely
whether there is any substantial evidence in the record to support the
decision.237 In either case, however, the review is of" the entire record
made before the trier of fact.238
Contrast the fairness of the foregoing procedure. with that which
exists under both the Auerbach and Zapata approaches. First, the
hearing body-the special litigation committee-rather than being
unbiased in the judicial sense, is composed of persons chosen, directly
or indirectly, by the defendant.2 39  The hearing body often appoints
235. See supra notes 220-30 and accompanying text with respect to statutory provisions
regarding the burden of proof in conflict of interest situations. The common law has always
placed the burden of proof upon a fiduciary who is charged with self-dealing, irrespective of
whether the alleged wrong is a conflict of interest or a usurpation of a corporate opportunity or
other self-dealing situation, and courts have vigorously scrutinized the defendant's actions. See,
e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952);
Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793, 800-02 (Ill. 1960); Klinicki v.
Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985). Even Delaware has generally recognized:
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness
of the bargain. The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one
stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness,
sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (citations omit-ed); see also Marciano v.
Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) (citing Weinberger).
236. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 I1A, para. 366(b)(1)(ii) (Smith-Hurd 1985) ("Any error
of fact, in that the judgment or order appealed from is not sustained by the evidence or is against
the weight of the evidence, may be brought up for review.").
237. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-110 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (providing, in part, that the
"findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be
prima faie true and correct"); see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 1977) (providing, in part, that a
reviewing court shall set aside agency action that is "unsupported by substantial evidence").
238. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-110 (Smith-Hurd 1985) which provides, in
part, that the "hearing and determination shall extend to all questions of law and of fact
presented by the entire record before the court." 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 1977) provides, in part,
that with respect to contested rule making or adjudicatory proceedings, "the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error."
239. See supra note 153 and text accompanying notes 138-42.
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investigators to assemble the facts for it.24° Thus, the system is closer
to an inquisitorial system than an adversary system. The fees for the
investigation are paid for by the corporation, not the defendant, and
there is often little incentive to limit the cost since the expenditure
benefits those in control. 241 In one case, the cost of investigating a not
unduly complicated charge of self-dealing amounted to $500,000.242
While reducing litigation costs is often suggested as a rationale for
using a special litigation committee, there are undoubtedly many
attorneys who would be happy to try such a case to judgment for less
than $500,000.243 Moreover, overall litigation costs are very likely
increased because the investigation involves an additional set of attor-
neys whose expenses will be paid by the corporation. Thus, under typ-
ical indemnification provisions, the corporation will pay not only the
legal counsel for the defendants, but also the legal counsel for the spe-
cial litigation committee.
The plaintiff may or may not have access to the hearing process,
that is, be able to present evidence to the special litigation committee.
Essentially, the "hearing" is an ex parte process with the investigators
reporting to the committee. If discovery is available, it may be limited
to the issues of whether the committee was unbiased and whether a
reasonable investigation was conducted in good faith. Under
Auerbach, the trial court cannot review the substantive decision so,
correlatively, discovery could not inquire into such matters. The
plaintiff has no right to challenge the probity or reliability of the evi-
dence or to cross examine witnesses before the special litigation
committee.
It is difficult to view this process from the perspective of who has
the burden of proof. The "hearing" is not really a hearing process but
rather a justification process. There is little incentive for the hearing
body to find for the plaintiff. After the "hearing" is over, the hearing
body will go back to work for, or with, the defendant. In fact, during
240. See, eg., Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Del. 1985); see supra notes 160, 162
and accompanying text.
241. The corporation pays the costs of the investigation whereas the defendants, who usually
control the corporation, would pay any judgment entered. Since the court, under either
Auerbach or Zapata, will look to the adequacy of the investigation, "spare no expense" will be
the order of the day.
242. Kaplan, 499 A.2d at 1187.
243. The author was recently engaged as an expert witness in corporate litigation involving a
breach of the duty of loyalty by corporate officers and directors. In discovery, thousands of
pages of documents were produced and about two dozen depositions were taken. More than
thirty witnesses testified in the trial extending over several weeks. Yet, the attorney fee submitted
to the court was approximately $275,000, considerably less than the $500,000 fee for the law firm
in Kaplan, id., for its "investigation" on behalf of the special litigation committee.
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the course of the hearing (investigation), the hearing body and the
defendant have worked side by side on board of director and commit-
tee matters. 2" In addition, during the course of the "hearing," the
defendant, through his control over, or influence an the nominating
committee, may have determined whether the hearing body members
would be retained as directors.245
As discussed previously, the special litigation committee invariably
moves to dismiss the litigation.246 In effect, the trial court then
becomes the reviewing court to determine whether the finding and rec-
ommendation should take effect. Under Auerbach, the special litiga-
tion committee's "evaluation of the problems posed and its judgment
in their resolution are beyond [judicial review]." 24 7 Thus, only a lim-
ited portion of the "record" is before the reviewing body. While
Zapata provides for some review of the substantive decision by
enabling the court to exercise its "business judgment," this phraseol-
ogy has subjected the Zapata approach to ridicule in the business
world.248 Zapata would be better received if the standard of review
had been articulated in traditional terms. Moreover, as previously dis-
cussed, Zapata "liberality" has been drastically circumscribed by the
subsequent expansion of the demand requirement in Delaware which
precludes the plaintiff from getting to court in the first place.249
The problem with entertaining a motion by a special litigation com-
mittee, even under a Zapata test, is illustrated by the decision in Houle
v. Lowe.2 50 Here, the Massachusetts Supreme Judical Court recog-
nized (i) that Massachusetts has always "'vigorously scrutinize[d] the
situation' where a director's loyalty to the corporation is in conflict
with his or her own self-interest" and (ii) that the "danger of 'struc-
tural bias'" is inherent in the use of a special litigation committee.251
Accordingly, the court rejected the lower court's deference to the spe-
cial litigation committee in granting summary judgment, adopted a
Zapata type two-step approach, and remanded for an evidentiary
hearing-at least with respect to part of the "record," namely the
committee's independence and good faith and the adequacy of its
investigation.252
244. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
245. See BACON & BROWN, supra note 152, at 28-29; see also supra note 153.
246. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
247. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979).
248. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
250. 556 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1990).
251. Id. at 59 (citation omitted).
252. Id. at 60.
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But beyond the issues of independence, good faith, and adequacy of
investigation, the supreme court also instructed the judge to determine
"on the basis of the evidence presented, whether the committee
reached a reasonable and principled decision." '253 The trial court's
standard of review apparently should be whether "the committee's
decision is contrary to the great weight of evidence." '254 Thus, as dis-
cussed above, even in a two-step Zapata type approach, the commit-
tee, in effect, is the trial court and the trial court becomes a reviewing
court.2 55
The crucial function of the trial judge in a non-jury case is to deter-
mine disputed issues of fact after hearing evidence and after having the
opportunity to appraise the credibility of witnesses upon cross-exami-
nation. But, when the "hearing" is the report of the special litigation
committee and the court's role is that of determining whether the
committee's decision is "contrary to the great weight of evidence, '256
the factual determination is not made by the trial court with its exper-
tise in assessing reliability and credibility, but by the (arguably) struc-
turally biased committee. This simply does not square with the
fundamental precept that "[u]nder our system of law, courts and not
litigants should decide the merits of litigation." 257
IX. SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES IN THE
CONTEXT OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
One of the most disturbing developments with respect to special liti-
gation committees is that they are now being employed in connection
with disputes among shareholders in closely held corporations. Quite
253. Id.
254. Id. The court suggested the following mechanism:
This inquiry will allow the special litigation committee to point out to the judge on what
factors it relied and why those factors support its decision. The test will also allow the
derivative plaintiff to point out factors not considered by the committee or why those relied
upon by the committee do not support its conclusion.
Id.
255. As discussed in the preceding section, see supra notes 220-30 and accompanying text,
this is hardly what the legislature intended in enacting a statute which merely changed the
burden of proof when a disinterested body approves the transaction. While a conflict of interest
statute was not implicated in Houle since the alleged transaction fell under the rubric of
corporate opportunity rather than conflict of interest, deferring to a special litigation committee
recommendation is inappropriate in any situation in which the duty of loyalty is the basis for the
litigation. Disinterested director approval should only change the burden of proof, not convert
the trial court into an appellate court and thereby limit its ability to make a factual
determination.
256. Houle, 556 N.E.2d at 59.
257. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. 1980).
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often these disputes involve breaches of the duty of loyalty.25
Although it is only recently that minority shareholders have realized
effective remedies when majority shareholders act in a heavy-handed
manner,259 use of special litigation committees in the close corporation
context carries with it the specter of destroying the derivative suit as a
brake upon wrongful conduct by the majority.
A. The Nature of Litigation in Closely Held Corporations
Most litigation in the close corporation context is a battle over the
spoils of success. Today, courts generally recognize close corporations
as incorporated partnerships. 2 t However, there are significant differ-
ences between the two forms of business organization. In a partner-
ship, absent an agreement between the partners to the contrary, no
partner is entitled to compensation for services 26 1 and, more impor-
tantly, any partner can dissolve the partnership, even in violation of
the agreement, and thus obtain a return of capital.262 Contrariwise, in
the corporate context, salaries are established by majority rule of the
board of directors,263 sometimes protected by the business judgment
rule.26 1 Further, because corporations are usually formed for a perpet-
ual existence, capital is locked-in-subject to the possibility that a fro-
zen-out minority shareholder may establish oppression or some other
258. Two Illinois cases, Forkin v. Cole, 548 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), and Romanik v.
Lurie Home Supply Ctr., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), illustrate the wide range of
conflicts that can arise. On the other hand, Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J.
1981), demonstrates that duty of care issues also arise in closely held corporations.
259. For a general perspective on this area, see Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of
Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact upon Valvation of Minority Shares,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 425 (1990). The spectra of special litigatio, committees in minority
shareholder litigation only arises in derivative actions such as those involving conflicts of
interests, corporate opportunities, competing with the corporation, or waste of corporate assets.
Other possible causes of action which may arise in the close corparation context, such as
oppressive conduct justifying dissolution or breach of a majority sharehiolder's fiduciary duty to
the minority, are individual actions rather than derivative actions and thus do not implicate the
use of special litigation committees.
260. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass.
1975).
261. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(f), 6 U.L.A. 213 (West 1981).
262. Id. §§ 31(2), 38(c), 6 U.L.A. at 376, 456-57.
263. See Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1626 (1978); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.05(c) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
264. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (discussed supra at footnotes 189-93
and accompanying text); cf Fields v. Sax, 462 N.E.2d 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (board approval of
salary aggregating $643,072 over five-year period to the chairman of the board who was
hospitalized for 251 days during that period and who was minimally involved in day-to-day
activities was protected by business judgment rule).
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basis for involuntary judicial dissolution 265 and thereafter overcome
the judicial fear that dissolution is a "drastic" remedy. 66
If the corporation is successful, the majority may take out excessive
compensation,267 thus reducing the profits available to the minority.
The majority may also foreclose the minority from any participation
in the profits, either by declaring no dividends if the minority share-
holder is inactive,2 68 or by firing a minority shareholder who had been
employed.269
The board of directors is often a de facto irrelevancy in the close
corporation context. Often no meetings are held27 1 or, if they are held,
the board is composed of the majority shareholder, his or her spouse
or accountant or attorney, and the minority shareholder.271 Thus,
meetings-to the extent they are held-are a mere formality because
the board is dominated by the majority shareholder. If structural bias
is a problem in the publicly held corporation where some of the disin-
265. 3 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 14.30(2), at 1527-28 (Supp. 1992).
266. See Murdock, supra note 259, at 440-52.
267. One valuation expert has stated:
In closely-held companies, it is common to find that compensation and perquisites to
owners and managers may be based on the personal desires of owners and on the company's
ability to pay rather than on the value of services performed for the company. How much
the earning power base should be adjusted to reflect discrepancies between compensation
paid and value of service performed depends on the purpose of the valuation.
Owners of successful closely-held businesses tend to take out what normally would be
considered profits in the form of compensation and discretionary expenses. This may be an
effort to avoid the double taxation that arises from paying a corporate income tax and then
paying a personal income tax on what is left from that paid in the form of dividends. It is
not uncommon to find an owner/manager of a successful company drawing $150,000
annual compensation, even though his services to the company could be replaced for
$60,000 per year. The extreme cases go much, much further.
If the owner/manager described in the previous paragraph wants to sell his business and
retire, the difference between his compensation and what it will cost to replace him will
become available as a part of pretax profits, and the earning power base should be adjusted
accordingly in establishing the selling price of the business.
SHANNON P. PRATT, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY
HELD COMPANIES 172-73 (1981). One court has found the entire $93,813 salary of the inactive
shareholder to be nonfunctional and $75,000 of the $250,000 salary of the active shareholder to
be nonfunctional. Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1329 (D.S.C. 1987).
268. Contra, eg., Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); In re
Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
269. Contra In re Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 444 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1981). See
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987).
270. See, e.g., Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 690 P.2d 1343, 1345 (Kan. 1984).
271. See, e.g., Will v. Engebretson & Co., Inc., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see
also Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 911 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), where the appellate court, in a
case involving self-dealing in a closely held corporation, noted in passing that the trial court
rejected a recomendation of a special litigation committee because all the members were not
disinterested.
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fectant power of sunlight is available through the disclosure mecha-
nisms of the federal securities laws, afortiori it is a much more serious
problem in the closely held corporation where both the players and
their counsel have been less subject to the discipline of disclosure than
their publicly traded corporation counterparts.
B. The Impact of Special Litigation Committees in Litigation
Involving Closely Held Corporations
Two recent cases demonstrate the cronyism that is very likely to
infect the special litigation process in the context of a closely held cor-
poration. In Will v. Engebretson & Co., Inc.,272 a 20% shareholder
brought a shareholder's derivative suit against the 80% shareholder
and his wife, charging they "had breached their fiduciary duty as
directors by receiving excessive and unreasonable amounts from Com-
pany in the form of salaries, dividends and/or deferred compensation
in excess of $4 million, and by failing to issue any d:.vidends to minor-
ity shareholders." '273 This is not an atypical type of dispute in closely
held corporations.
At the time the suit was filed, the wife had been replaced as a direc-
tor by her brother.274 A couple of months after the suit was filed, two
additional members were added to the board-both of whom, the
plaintiff charged, were business clients or relatives of the defendant
majority shareholder.275 The brother and the two new directors were
appointed as a compensation committee. 276 The committee met with
counsel by a conference telephone call, reviewed a two-page analysis
by an accounting firm, and recommended the suit be dropped.277 The
trial court viewed the corporation's summary judgment motion as a
hybrid dismissal motion and conducted only a limited review on the
merits to determine the committee's "good faith. ' 278 It found the
committee to be disinterested and its decision to be in good faith.27 9
However, the California appellate court determined that the plaintiff
had submitted evidence that the special litigation committee was not
independent and that it did not make a good faith investigation.28
The appellate court viewed the committee, not as disinterested in the
272. 261 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
273. Id. at 869.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 870.
276. Id. at 869.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 870.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 874.
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legal sense, but rather disinterested in the sense of uninterested.281
Accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to a trial on the merits.
For the trial court to have deferred to a special litigation committee
appointed by the majority shareholder, and consisting of two of his
business associates who were appointed for the obvious purpose of
approving his compensation, is akin to the ostrich putting its head in
the sand. The average citizen would see through such a subterfuge in
an instant. Yet judges sometimes repress their common sense and get
caught up in formalities. It strains credibility to believe that the
brother and the two business associates would ever combine to oppose
action by the eighty percent shareholder. Empirically, it is likely that
the new directors never personally attended another meeting.
The fact pattern in Houle v. LoW2 82 was even more egregious from
the standpoint of the independence, or rather lack thereof, of the spe-
cial litigation committee. Here the issue very likely went beyond
structural bias to actual domination. The plaintiff was a minority
shareholder in Eye Health, the corporate umbrella under which the
plaintiff and defendants practiced ophthalmology. 283 The parties dis-
cussed forming a surgical center to provide outpatient operating serv-
ices, after which the plaintiff visited such a facility in another state and
submitted a written report to his fellow shareholders and directors.284
The majority shareholders decided to launch the surgical center, but
by forming another corporation from which plaintiff was excluded.285
Litigation ensued, part of which was a derivative action against the
defendants predicated on the corporate opportunity theory.28 6
The directors appointed a junior physician, who was a director and
shareholder of Eye Health but not a defendant, as a special litigation
committee of one.287 She determined that the derivative suit was not
in the best interest of the corporation. 288 The plaintiff challenged her
independence on the basis of the "closeness of her professional associa-
tion" with the defendants, "her business connections with them, and
her dependency on them for future economic success. ' 289 The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court found her position was "particularly sus-
281. See id.
282. 556 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1990).
283. Id. at 52.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 53.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 58.
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pect."'29 Accordingly, the court reversed the summary judgment
because the material fact of whether the committee was independent
and unbiased was in dispute.29'
To recognize the efficacy of a special litigation committee in the
context of a closely held corporation where the board of directors is
rarely a functioning entity is to exalt form over substance. Neither the
brother nor the business associates in Engebretson, nor the young doc-
tor in Houle, had any particular expertise in dealing with conflict of
interest situations, nor the independence to make an impartial deci-
sion. As previously discussed, the issue raised in litigation involving
closely held corporations often is whether the majority shareholder
has appropriated property in which the minority shareholder has an
interest--either the profits of the business through salaries or other
diversions, or business opportunities. This is an issue for judges to
decide, not laymen who are hand-picked by the defendant.
X. CONCLUSION
The business judgment rule-the focus of most eases dealing with
issues involving special litigation committees-shoald not be blindly
applied. The rule is a practical recognition that there are some issues
with which judges have no particular expertise. It is, however, more
than that. It is also a recognition that judicial intrusion into the oper-
ating decisions of a business can work substantial mischief. MBA pro-
grams to the contrary notwithstanding, business is an art and not a
science. Business decisions are multi-faceted and interwoven. Success
and failure implicate good luck and bad luck, as well as good judg-
ment and bad judgment.292 In the present economic and political sys-
tem, risk taking and entrepreneurship are encouraged.293 There is no
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See Dooley & Veasey, supra, note 121, at 530-31. As one federal court, in discussing the
subject of special litigation committees, states:
[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate
corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not
easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for
quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information. The entrepreneur's
function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the
time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect
knowledge.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982).
293. Increased risk may correlate with increased profits. See WILLIAN A. KLEIN, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 166-70 (1980); see also Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982). For later discussion of this topic, see WILLIAM A.
KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 206-16 (4th ed. 1990).
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assurance that any particular business judgment will turn out for the
better and some may even lead to the ruin of a particular business, 294
but, on the whole, the predominant belief is that society is the better
where initiative and risk taking are encouraged. In general, judicial
hindsight of operating business decisions, except in extreme circum-
stances, is antithetical to the present political and economic
philosophy.
On the other hand, this system has always expected integrity of fidu-
ciaries. Courts have been overseeing fiduciary obligations for centu-
ries. Recent experience in the securities industry with its insider
trading scandals, and in the savings and loan industry with its sweet-
heart deals and sham transactions, demonstrate that business experi-
ence provides no special insight into issues of integrity.
There is a simplistic logic in arguing that second-tier decisions by
special litigation committees implicate business judgment and thus the
nature of the first-tier alleged wrong-whether it is a duty of care or a
duty of loyalty type issue-is irrelevant in determining the scope of
judicial deference to the second-tier decision. However, such logic
misses the underlying rationale for creating the business judgment rule
in the first place: the limited competence of courts to address certain
issues. This rationale has no relevance, however, when the issue at
hand is one with which the courts have traditionally dealt and with
which the competence of the court matches or exceeds that of the
board of directors
A special litigation committee could not dismiss a criminal securi-
ties or antitrust indictment. The subjects of such indictments-
manipulating the price of a corporation's stock to forestall a hostile
bidder,295 or fixing prices to improve margins-are a form of business
decision and are acceptable in some countries. But we do not allow
the board of directors to make such decisions, even if they receive no
direct personal benefit.
Obviously, a criminal prosecution implicates interests outside the
corporation-those of the public-which is why criminal actions are
294. In the early 1980s, Ford Motor Co., in effect, bet its future on the Ford Taurus by
investing $3.2 billion in the new model. Ford teetered on the brink of disaster before the new
models turned the company around. Had Ford guessed wrong on the success of its "jellybean"
cars, the company would have been insolvent. RICHARD TANNER PASCALE, MANAGING ON
THE EDGE 116-17 (1990). Compare the history of General Motors in the 1980s. See James B.
Treece, GM-The Board Revolt, Bus. WK., Apr. 20, 1992, at 30-34.
295. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970), rev'd sub noma. Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332
(2d Cir. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 244 (1979); cf Carol J. Loomis, How Drexel
Rigged A Stock, FORTUNE, Nov. 19, 1990, at 83.
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brought in the name of the people. In the duty of loyalty area, there
are, in effect, outside interests as well. Investors take the risk of busi-
ness decisions; they do not take the risk of divided loyalty by those to
whom they entrust the operation of their business. Moreover, the con-
fidence of the public in the system of centralized management to
which investors entrust their capital is also at stake.
In the public corporation area, pro-business publications, such as
Business Week Fortune, and the Wall Street Journal,2 96 have been
raising questions for the past year as to how well the board of directors
is monitoring the compensation levels of top management, and
whether there is any correlation between such compensation and cor-
porate performance. One pay consultant has stated that "[i]f the
board doesn't get ahold of executive pay very quickly, I think the fed-
eral government will. The directors are just not doing their job, and
it's running out of control. '297
In the public corporation area, excessive withdrawals by top man-
agement have only a minuscule effect upon the bottom line because the
ratio of management compensation to net income is so small. In the
close corporation, however, excessive withdrawals by one shareholder
can markedly affect the value of another shareholder's interest.298
Thus, particularly in the close corporation context, issues involving
self-dealing and abuse of a fiduciary responsibility are for judges to
decide, not laymen who are hand-picked by the defendants for the sole
purpose of ridding those in control of inconvenient litigation. In the
close corporation, no one is so naive at to suggest that the new direc-
tors (appointed by those in control to dismiss the litigation) will
remain on the board of directors, nor that if they did they would man-
age it independently of the majority shareholder who theretofore dom-
inated the board of directors-if in fact the board functioned at all.
The purpose of the derivative suit is to protect shareholders by
insuring that a disinterested, independent, and competent body will be
available to oversee the actions of those entrusted to manage the cor-
poration. A case can be made for such oversight by a special litigation
committee in the duty of care area, so long as there is some judicial
review of the substantive decision as in Zapata. But there is no reason
to oust courts from oversight in duty of loyalty cases. This is an area
of traditional competence for the judiciary. A derivative plaintiff
296. Graef S. Crystal, Seeking the Sense in CEO Pay, FORTUNE, June 5, 1989, at 88; Byrne,
supra note 146, at 90; Executive Pay, supra note 142; see also sources cited supra note 6.
297. Byrne, supra note 146, at 91.
298. See supra note 268; notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
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alleging a breach of the duty of loyalty by a fiduciary is entitled to a
hearing before a judge, rather than before laymen with no particular
qualifications or jurisdictional empowerment to decide matters of fidu-
ciary responsibility. Absent compelling reasons to the contrary-of
which there are none in the duty of loyalty area-"[u]nder our system
of law, courts and not litigants should decide the merits of
litigation." '299
299. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. 1980).
